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I. Introduction
I was confronted with an application . . . on my first day of criminal
duty. . . . for something called "cell site information." Reluctant to sign
what I did not understand, I turned to the United States Code and
encountered ECPA for the first time. The experience was frustrating:
the terminology was unfamiliar, the organization not intuitive, and the
syntax far from straightforward. The casenotes accompanying the
statute shed no light; they cited only a handful of lower court decisions
not particularly relevant to my questions. No appellate court had ever
addressed the issue. I asked my colleagues on the bench, and found they
were just as puzzled as I was. I tried to look at sample orders from other
courts, but found that they were sealed. I met (several times) with
AUSAs, who basically argued that their request should be granted
1
because other judges had done so.

United States Magistrate Judge Stephen W. Smith, in written
testimony to Congress, concisely summarized the frustrating state of the
law regarding cell site information disclosure orders.2 Perhaps such
confusion would be acceptable if law enforcement rarely requested this
information or if the privacy interests at stake were limited, but estimates
place the number of electronic surveillance orders issued at the federal level
alone in excess of 10,000,3 and the United States is rapidly approaching 300
million cellular phone users.4 The proliferation of cellular phones and the
tenuous protection granted to the location information these phones

1. See Hearing on Electronic Communications Privacy Act Reform and the
Revolution in Location Based Technologies and Services: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 81–85 (2010) (written testimony of Hon. Stephen W. Smith,
United States Mag. J.) [hereinafter Smith ECPA Reform Testimony] (describing the
magistrate judge’s experience dealing with requests for "prospective" or "real time" CSLI
disclosure requests and the different considerations that arise when handling requests for
"historical" CSLI).
2. See id. (summarizing his experiences with CSLI disclosure cases and discussing
the published decisions by other magistrate judges on the issue).
3. See id. at 80 ("A reasonable estimate is that the total number of electronic
surveillance orders issued at the federal level each year substantially exceeds 10,000.").
4. See CTIA-The Wireless Association, CTIA’s Semi-Annual Wireless Industry
Survey (2010), http://ctia.org/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2011) (estimating that as of June 2010
there were 292,847,098 cell phones in use in the United States) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
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transmit raises the question, as one commentator put it, of just who knows
where you’ve been?5
Approximately every seven seconds, your cellular phone
communicates with the nearest cellular tower.6 This process is called
registration, and its primary purpose is to continuously update the cellular
network on your location: By identifying the nearest tower, the network
can quickly route any incoming call through that tower instead of having to
locate your phone mid-call.7 However, under the Stored Communications
Act (SCA),8 registration can serve a very different purpose.9 By gathering a
sequential history of this cell site location information (CSLI), it is possible
for the government to determine the whereabouts of your cell phone within
approximately 200 feet every seven seconds.10
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, deciding an issue of first
impression in the U.S. Courts of Appeals,11 found that, under the SCA and
5. Stephanie Lockwood, Who Knows Where You’ve Been? Privacy Concerns
Regarding the Use of Cellular Phones as Personal Locators, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307,
308 (2004) (introducing the issue by posing questions such as "[w]hat information should be
available to law enforcement?").
6. See In re U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to
Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 589–90 (W.D. Pa. 2008) [hereinafter
Pennsylvania 2008 Opinion] ("Cell phones, whenever on, now automatically communicate
with cell towers, constantly relaying their location information to the towers that serve their
network and scanning for the one that provides the strongest signal/best reception. This
process, called ‘registration’, occurs approximately every seven seconds.") [vacated
language].
7. See Radio-Electronics.com, Mobile Phone Network Registration, http://
www.radio-electronics.com/info/cellulartelecomms/cellular_concepts/registration.php (last
visited Nov. 15, 2010) (discussing the need for a registration system for the cellular network
to function and noting that "[e]ven when the mobile is in what is termed its idle mode it will
periodically communicate with the network to update its position and status") (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
8. See Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–11 (2006) (regulating the
acquisition by law enforcement of user account information stored by private parties in the
ordinary course of business).
9. See id. § 2703(c)(1) (providing for when "[a] governmental entity may require a
provider of electronic communication service or remote computing service to disclose a
record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service").
10. See Pennsylvania 2008 Opinion, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 590 (describing the ability of
cell phone towers to place a phone’s location within 200 feet in urban areas).
11. See In re U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to
Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 315 (3d Cir. 2010) [hereinafter Third Circuit
Opinion] (concluding that "the SCA does not contain any language that requires the
Government to show probable cause as a predicate for a court order under § 2703(d)"); id. at
319 (finding that the Stored Communications Act "as presently written gives the [reviewing
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the Fourth Amendment, the government need not show probable cause in
order to obtain CSLI.12 Instead, the court found that the government need
only provide "specific and articulable facts showing that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the . . . information sought . . . [is]
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation";13 the court did
add, however, that the statute allowed the reviewing judge the option of
requiring a warrant showing probable cause.14 The law is greatly unsettled
in this area, with many district courts drawing their own lines, focusing on
whether the CSLI sought was historical or prospective.15 The Third Circuit,
judge] the option to require a warrant showing probable cause"). In Third Circuit Opinion,
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals considered an issue of first impression among the circuit
courts: Whether a court may deny the government’s application for information under 18
U.S.C. § 2703(d) once the government has satisfied that Section’s burden of proof. Id. at
305–06. The court specified that the government’s request was limited to "information
pertaining to a subscriber" contained in § 2703(c). Id. at 306. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(d), the government may obtain this information based on a showing of "specific and
articulable facts establishing reasonable grounds" that the information sought is "relevant
and material to an ongoing criminal investigation." Id. at 308. The court determined that
CSLI was a "wire communication," not an "electronic communication," and as such even if a
cell phone is deemed a tracking device CSLI was not excluded by the SCA’s disclosure
provision prohibiting inclusion of "electronic communications" obtained from a tracking
device. Id. at 310. Looking to Congress’s intent, the court concluded that the standard for
disclosure under § 2703(d) was meant to be lower than the probable cause required for
tracking devices because "cell site information provides only a rough indication of a user’s
location at the time a call was made or received." Id. at 312–13. Thus, the court held that
CSLI could be obtained under § 2703(d) and that probable cause need not be shown to
require the disclosure. Id. at 313. The court then proceeded to consider whether magistrate
judges have the discretion to require a probable cause warrant on a case-by-case basis. Id. at
315. The court found the statute’s language established a necessary, but insufficient,
condition for disclosure of the requested information. Id. at 316–17. Based on this
interpretation, the court found that as written the statute gave the Magistrate Judge the option
to require a showing of probable cause in any individual case, while recommending that this
option be used "sparingly." Id. at 319. Appling these principles to the present case, the
court vacated the magistrate judge’s order denying the government’s application, and
remanded the application to the district court for a determination of whether the government
had satisfied the "specific and articulable facts" that are "relevant and material" standard. Id.
12. See id. at 315 ("[W]e conclude that the SCA does not contain any language that
requires the Government to show probable cause as a predicate for a court order under
§ 2703(d) . . . .").
13. Id. at 319 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)) (internal quotations omitted).
14. See id. ("[T]he statute as presently written gives the M[agistrate] J[udge] the
option to require a warrant showing probable cause.").
15. See, e.g., In re the Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation
and Use of a Pen Register and/or Trap and Trace for Mobile Identification No. (585) 1111111 and the Disclosure of Subscriber and Activity Info. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2703, 415 F.
Supp. 2d 211, 214 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) [hereinafter New York Feb. 2006 Opinion] (accepting,
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as the first federal court of appeals to rule on the issue, will likely influence
future decisions in other circuits.16
The difference between traditional "probable cause" warrants and the
standard required for information disclosure under the Stored
Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) provides substantially different
protection for the targets of CSLI requests.17 This Note considers whether
the Third Circuit decision, allowing prosecutors to obtain CSLI without a
showing of probable cause, contravenes the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures.18 This Note proposes that it
does.19 The Third Circuit based much of its decision on incorrect
in dicta, the Government’s interpretation of SCA as authorizing it to obtain historical CSLI);
In re the Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Disclosure of Prospective Cell
Site Info., 412 F. Supp. 2d 947, 949 (E.D. Wis. 2006) [hereinafter Wisconsin Opinion]
(concluding, in dicta and without analysis, that the Government’s request for prospective
CSLI requires probable cause because it requested prospective rather than historical
information); In re an Application of U.S. for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen
Register and a Trap and Trace Device and (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info.
and/or Cell Site Info., 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 303 n.6 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) [hereinafter New York
Oct. 2005 Opinion] (stating, in dicta and without explanation, that § 2703(d) "plainly
allows" the Government to seek historical CSLI); In re Application for Pen Register and
Trap/Trace Device With Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 759 n.16 (S.D. Tex.
2005) [hereinafter Texas 2005 Opinion] (stating, in dicta, that were the communication
service providers to compile the tracking information themselves, it would bring the
information "more comfortably" within the scope of the Stored Communications Act).
16. See Third Circuit Opinion, 620 F.3d at 305–06 ("This appeal gives us our first
opportunity to review whether a court can deny a Government application under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(d) after the Government has satisfied its burden of proof under that provision, a task
that to our knowledge has not been performed by any other court of appeals."); see also
Pennsylvania 2008 Opinion, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 616 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (concluding that the
Government does not have the authority to require the disclosure of "cell-phone-derived
movement/location information . . . absent a showing of probable cause"), vacated, 620 F.3d
304 (3d Cir. 2010).
17. Compare Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949) (defining
probable cause to exist where "the facts and circumstances within [the officers’] knowledge
and of which they [have] reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves
to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has or is being
committed" (internal quotations omitted)), with Pennsylvania 2008 Opinion, 534 F. Supp. 2d
at 588 (denying the government’s request for CSLI regarding an individual not suspected of
criminal activity but who purportedly associates with a "Criminal Suspect" on a showing of
"specific and articulable facts" under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)), vacated, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir.
2010).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause . . . and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.").
19. See infra Part VI ("[B]ecause CSLI will almost always reveal information about
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assumptions regarding the technology at issue,20 and thus, under certain
circumstances, the substantive holding requires lower courts to follow
procedure that is not justified by the Third Circuit’s own rationale.21 After
clarifying the functionality and potential uses of the technology at issue,
this Note argues that, based on existing precedent and the Third Circuit’s
own rationale, in almost all CSLI disclosure cases the information obtained
is protected by the Fourth Amendment and therefore a showing of probable
cause should be necessary to obtain CSLI.
Part II begins by providing some basic information on cellular phone
technology and the way CSLI is gathered specifically, and then discusses
the distinctions between historical, prospective, and real time CSLI.22 Part
III.A lays out the background to the CSLI disclosure debate, covering first
the relevant Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and then discussing the
application of several statutes which arguably govern CSLI.23 In Part III.B,
the interior of the home that is protected by the Fourth Amendment, magistrate judges
should either require a showing of probable cause, or allow law enforcement to only use
CSLI that does not reveal information about the interior of the home.").
20. Compare Third Circuit Opinion, 620 F.3d 304, 312 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating "cell
site information provides only a rough indication of a user’s location at the time the call was
made or received" (emphasis added)), with Pennsylvania 2008 Opinion, 534 F. Supp. 2d at
589–90 ("Cell phones, whenever on, now automatically communicate with cell towers,
constantly relaying their location information to the towers that serve their network . . .
approximately every seven seconds."), vacated, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010), and
Lockwood, supra note 5, at 309 ("Even when users are not making or receiving calls, cell
phones communicate with the nearest cell tower to register."), and Radio-Electronics.com,
Mobile Phone Network Registration, http://www.radio-electronics.com/info/cellular
telecomms/cellular_concepts/registration.php (last visited Nov. 15, 2010) ("Even if a call is
not made instantly, the network needs to be able to communicate with the mobile to know
where it is." (emphasis added)) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
compare Third Circuit Opinion, 620 F.3d at 312 ("CSLI may, under certain circumstances,
be used to approximate the past location of a person."), with Pennsylvania 2008 Opinion,
534 F. Supp. 2d at 590 ("In urban areas, where towers have become increasingly
concentrated, tracking the location of just the nearest tower itself can place the phone within
approximately 200 feet."), vacated, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).
21. See Third Circuit Opinion, 620 F.3d at 315 (concluding that "the SCA does not
contain any language that requires the Government to show probable cause as a predicate for
a court order under § 2703(d)"); id. at 312 ("If it can be used to allow the inference of
present, or even future, location, in this respect CSLI may resemble a tracking device which
provides information as to the actual whereabouts of the subject.").
22. See infra Part II (providing basic information about cellular networks, cell phone
registration, and the distinction between historical and prospective CSLI).
23. See infra Part III.A (discussing the definition of a "search" under the Fourth
Amendment, analyzing the factors to be considered in making the determination of whether
a search has occurred in the CSLI context, and identifying the statutes relevant to CSLI
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the general state of the law prior to In re the United States of America for
an Order Directing a Provider of Electronic Communication Service to
Disclose Records to the Government24 (Third Circuit Opinion) is
summarized by briefly analyzing the holdings and rationales of the federal
district courts in CSLI disclosure order cases.25 Part IV discusses the Third
Circuit Opinion in full detail, focusing on the facts and methodology the
court used to arrive at its various conclusions.26 Then, in Part V, the
reasoning discussed in Part IV is revisited and critiqued with reference to
the realities of CSLI technology.27 Finally, on the basis of this analysis,
Part VI presents this Note’s conclusion regarding the soundness of the
Third Circuit Opinion’s rationale and recommends a possible approach to
handling future CSLI disclosure cases based on existing precedent in light
of the breadth of CSLI, which the Third Circuit failed to recognize.28
II. A Brief Overview of CSLI Technology
To understand the debate over CSLI disclosure, it is necessary to have
some basic knowledge regarding the technology at issue. When a cell
phone is turned on, one of the first things that occurs is registration.29 For
the cellular network to function efficiently, the network must be aware of
the cell phone’s location so it can route incoming calls through the
disclosure order cases).
24. See Third Circuit Opinion, 620 F.3d at 315 (concluding that "the SCA does not
contain any language that requires the Government to show probable cause as a predicate for
a court order under § 2703(d)").
25. See infra Part III.B (summarizing several CSLI disclosure case rationales
prevalent prior to Third Circuit Opinion).
26. See infra Part IV (presenting the facts and reasoning used by the court in Third
Circuit Opinion).
27. See infra Part V (discussing Third Circuit Opinion by focusing on the court’s
characterization of CSLI technology and the scope of Fourth Amendment protection as it
applies to CSLI).
28. See infra Part VI (proposing that magistrate judges should either require a showing
of probable cause or require the disclosure order to be minimized in order to exclude the use
of location information that places the target inside the home).
29. See
Radio-Electronics.com,
Mobile
Phone
Network
Registration,
http://www.radio-electronics.com/info/cellulartelecomms/cellular_concepts/registration.php
(last visited Nov. 15, 2010) (describing the tasks a cell phone undertakes when it is turned
on, and noting that the majority of the process involves registration with the cellular
network) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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appropriate location.30 Each cell phone has a unique Mobile Identification
Number (MIN) and Electronic Serial Number (ESN) that identify it to the
cellular network during registration.31 The cell phone communicates this
information to the cell tower whenever it is on, whether or not calls are
being made or received.32 The cell phone must reregister periodically so
that a user moving from one place to another will still have calls routed
through the nearest base station.33 This reregistration takes place
approximately every seven seconds.34
Every tower in a cellular provider’s network within range of an active
cell phone receives the information sent during registration.35 To determine
which tower is closest to the cell phone, and thus, how to route incoming
calls when two towers receive signals from a single phone, the network
uses one of two systems to pinpoint the phone’s location.36 A network may
use a Time Distance of Arrival (TDOA) system, which determines location
by measuring and comparing the time it takes the signal to arrive at each
tower.37 Similarly, an Angle of Arrival (AOA) system measures the angle
from which the signal reaches multiple towers, and uses that information to
triangulate the cell phone’s location.38 The ability to precisely locate an
30. See id. (explaining that registration allows the network to "route any calls through
the relevant base station as the network would be soon overloaded if the notification of an
incoming call had to be sent via several base stations").
31. See Lockwood, supra note 5, at 309 (describing how the MIN and ESN are
assigned to cellular phones and identify them).
32. See id. ("Even when users are not making or receiving calls, cell phones
communicate with the nearest cell tower to register.").
33. See id. ("Given the inherently mobile nature of cell phones, units update their
registration periodically so that the database is current.").
34. See Pennsylvania 2008 Opinion, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 589–90 (W.D. Pa. 2008)
("Cell phones, whenever on, now automatically communicate with cell towers, constantly
relaying their location information to the towers serving their network and scanning for the
one that provides the strongest signal/best reception. This process, called ‘registration’,
occurs approximately every seven seconds."), vacated, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).
35. See Lockwood, supra note 5, at 308 ("Each tower in a provider’s network is
equipped with radio intercepts that receive signals from any active cell phone.").
36. See id. at 308–09 (explaining how the network uses the registration signal to
determine which receiving tower is closest to the phone).
37. See id. (noting that the time of arrival allows a single tower to estimate the
distance between the tower and the phone, while signals arriving at more than one tower
allow the network to use an algorithm based on the this data to calculate the phone’s
longitude and latitude).
38. See id. at 309 ("When multiple towers receive signals, the system can compare the
angles of arrival and thus triangulate the relative location of the cell phone.").
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individual cell phone is thus predicated largely on the presence of multiple
cell towers, which do not exist in some rural areas.39
However, in urban environments, providers often maintain a large
number of cell towers, and location information obtained from providers in
these locations can be very accurate.40 As noted in In re the United States
of America for an Order Directing a Provider of Electronic Communication
Service to Disclose Records to the Government41 (Pennsylvania 2008
Opinion), "[i]n urban areas, where towers have become increasingly
concentrated, tracking the location of just the nearest tower itself can place
the phone within approximately 200 feet."42 By using more sophisticated
methods, like triangulation, the phone can be tracked even more precisely.43
Thus, because of the inherently mobile nature of cell phones, CSLI can be
used to provide detailed information about the location and movement of an
individual carrying the device even if that individual never makes a call.44
CSLI data is continually collected by telecommunications providers.45
Requests for disclosure of such collected information can either seek to
obtain "historical" CSLI, "real time" CSLI, or both.46 Because both
39. See id. (recognizing that in rural areas, "the location information available to
providers is significantly less accurate simply because fewer towers are available" to receive
a given phone’s signal).
40. See id. (explaining that the sectioning of towers "into directional ‘faces’ (north
face, south face, etc.)" and the significant number of towers in a relatively small area "gives
providers access to quite accurate location information").
41. See Pennsylvania 2008 Opinion, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 616 (W.D. Pa. 2008)
(concluding that the Government does not have the authority to require the disclosure of
"cell-phone-derived movement/location information . . . absent a showing of probable
cause"), vacated, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).
42. Id. at 590.
43. See id. (discussing how TDOA and AOA triangulation systems as well as
determining which face of the tower is receiving the signal can allow providers to more
accurately determine the phone’s location).
44. See Lockwood, supra note 5, at 312 ("The reality that people carry their cell
phones on their persons means that cell phone tracking technology potentially offers a
detailed view of a given subscriber’s movements rather than simply providing callidentifying information."); see also id. at 309 ("Even when users are not making or receiving
calls, cell phones communicate with the nearest cell tower to register.").
45. See id. at 309 ("Even when users are not making calls, cell phones communicate
with the nearest cell tower to register.").
46. See Smith ECPA Reform Testimony, 111th Cong. 81–85 (2010) (written testimony
of Hon. Stephen W. Smith, United States Mag. J.) (describing the magistrate judge’s
experience dealing with requests for "prospective" or "real time" CSLI disclosure requests
and the different considerations that arise when handling requests for "historical" CSLI).
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historical and real time CSLI will ultimately be obtained from the
telecommunications provider’s record of stored information, the distinction
between the two from the perspective of the provider is limited—in the first
instance law enforcement is given access to the already extant information,
and in the second they are given access to the information as soon as it
becomes available to the provider.47 Regardless, the provider is being
ordered to disclose stored CSLI data, the only difference being the length of
time that the information has been stored.48
The historical versus real time distinction becomes important in
relation to the privacy interest of the target. Historical CSLI enables law
enforcement to reconstruct a person’s movements and determine where
they were located at a given time prior to the disclosure order.49 Real time
CSLI can be used to actually track the present movements of an
individual.50 "Prospective" and "real time" CSLI are commonly confused
as interchangeable,51 but real time CSLI is actually a distinct subset of
prospective CSLI, "which refers to all cell site information that is generated
after the government has received court permission to acquire it."52
The following hypothetical, adapted from In re the Application of the
United States of America for an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use
of a Pen Register and a Caller Identification System on Telephone Numbers
[Sealed] and [Sealed] and the Production of Real Time Cell Site
47. See id. at 84–85 (explaining the rationale for viewing historical CSLI as similarly
invasive to privacy concerns as real time CSLI); Pennsylvania 2008 Opinion, 534 F. Supp.
2d 585, 601 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (reasoning that there was no warranted "distinction between
real-time (‘prospective’) and stored (‘historic’) cell-phone-derived movement/location
information"), vacated, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).
48. See Pennsylvania 2008 Opinion, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 601 (concluding that, from a
Fourth Amendment and statutory perspective, historical CSLI is indistinguishable from
prospective CSLI and that probable cause is required for both types of information).
49. See Lockwood, supra note 5, at 311 (describing how a police investigator was able
to recreate the suspect’s movements by referencing which cell tower picks up a cellular
phone’s transmissions).
50. See In re the Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use
of a Pen Register and a Caller Identification Sys. on Tel. Nos. [Sealed] and [Sealed] and the
Prod. of Real Time Cell Site Info., 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 599 (D. Md. 2005) [hereinafter
Maryland 2005 Opinion] ("‘Real time’ cell site information refers to data used by the
government to identify the location of a phone at the present moment.").
51. See id. at 598 n.2 ("The government appears to use the terms ‘real time cell site
information’ and ‘prospective cell site information’ interchangeably, but the two are
distinct.").
52. Id. at 599.
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Information53 (Maryland 2005 Opinion), illustrates the difference between
the three classifications of CSLI: Suppose the government receives an
order granting access to both historical and prospective CSLI on Monday
(the prospective order permitting the disclosure of all CSLI going
forward).54 Any CSLI records that the government obtains for dates prior
to Monday will be historical CSLI.55 If "[o]n Thursday, the government
begins tracking the phone in real time; such information is both prospective
and real time CSLI."56 On Friday, when the government accesses the CSLI
records from Tuesday and Wednesday, "such information is prospective but
not real time cell site information."57 In sum, all CSLI that is created after
the disclosure order is obtained is prospective CSLI,58 all CSLI that was in
existence prior to the disclosure order is historical CSLI,59 and only CSLI
that is provided in real time to law enforcement after the disclosure order is
real time CSLI. The realities of CSLI technology and the type of
information to which access is being sought are both important factors to
keep in mind when looking at CSLI disclosure order cases.
III. State of the Law Regarding CSLI
A. Origins of the Dispute
There is a long background of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and
numerous statutory provisions that impact the current debate over CSLI
53. See id. at 605 (finding the government’s proffered statutory authority insufficient
to authorize an order for cell site information absent a showing of probable cause).
54. See id. at 599 n.5 ("For example, imagine the government receives a court order on
a Monday granting access to prospective cell site information (i.e. all cell site information
generated going forward).").
55. See id. at 599 ("Records stored by the wireless service provider that detail the
location of a cell phone in the past (i.e.: prior to entry of the court order authorizing
government acquisition) are known as ‘historical’ cell site information.").
56. Id. at 599 n.5.
57. See id. ("On Friday, the government goes back and accesses the records of the
phone’s location on Tuesday and Wednesday; such information is prospective but not real
time cell site information.").
58. See id. at 599 (describing prospective CSLI as "all cell site information that is
generated after the government has received court permission to acquire it").
59. See id. ("Records stored by the wireless service provider that detail the location of
a cell phone in the past (i.e.: prior to entry of the court order authorizing government
acquisition) are known as ‘historical’ cell site information.").
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disclosure. Broadly categorized, the electronic surveillance tools available
under federal law can be envisioned as falling into four separate categories,
each of which requires a specific level of proof on the part of the
government.60 At the lowest end of the spectrum are pen register and trap
and trace devices, which may be used based on a showing that the
information obtained "is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation."61 A
slightly higher standard, that the government present "specific and
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
the . . . records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an
ongoing criminal investigation," is required by statute for disclosure of
stored communications or customer account records.62 To engage in
surveillance activity that is categorized as a "search" or "seizure," the
Fourth Amendment requires law enforcement to obtain a warrant supported
by probable cause,63 and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure specify
how such a warrant is to be obtained.64 And finally, at the most restrictive
end of the spectrum, content-capturing wiretaps are subject to the highest
standard, and they may only be used in circumstances where law
enforcement has satisfied requirements above and beyond the determination
of probable cause.65
Looking at these four tiers of electronic surveillance, it is important to
note where the standard is governed by constitutional principles, where the
obligation is purely statutory, and where these two considerations
potentially overlap.66 Absent a finding that the surveillance at issue
60. See In re the Application of U.S. for an Order: (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen
Register and Trap and Trace Device; (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber and Other Info.;
and (3) Authorizing the Disclosure of Location-Based Servs., 727 F. Supp. 2d 571, 572–73
(W.D. Tex. 2010) [hereinafter Texas 2010 Opinion] (outlining the four types of electronic
surveillance that federal permits to be used as "criminal investigative tools").
61. 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2) (2006).
62. Id. § 2703(d) (emphasis added).
63. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure . . . against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause . . . .").
64. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d) (defining the general standard for issuing a warrant to
"search for and seize a person or property or to install and use a tracking device" as
"probable cause").
65. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) (2006) (listing the specific circumstances, such as "when
such interception may provide or has provided evidence of the commission of the offense of
murder, kidnapping, gambling, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic drugs,"
where interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications will be permitted).
66. See Smith ECPA Reform Testimony, 111th Cong. 81–82 (2010) (written testimony
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constitutes a search or seizure, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated and
law enforcement need only comply with the relevant statutory provision.67
Where a search or seizure of something in which an individual has a
recognizable privacy interest is to occur, the Fourth Amendment generally
requires a warrant supported by probable cause.68 In the realm of
constitutionally recognized searches and seizures, statutes may define the
procedure for obtaining a warrant69 or may impose additional obstacles to
disclosure.70 To determine which standard governs CSLI disclosure, the
courts have had to attempt to place it within this complex tangle of
constitutional jurisprudence and statutory language.71 At its core, the
dispute centers on two questions: First, whether obtaining CSLI is a
"search" which must comply with the Fourth Amendment; and, second, if it
is not a "search," what statutory provision governs the disclosure of CSLI?

of Stephen W. Smith, United States Mag. J.) (identifying the four possible categories of
investigative tools authorized under the ECPA and describing the relevant individual
determination as deciding "which . . . was the best fit for this type of request").
67. See Laurie Thomas Lee, Can Police Track Your Wireless Calls? Call Location
Information and Privacy Laws, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 381, 387–88 (2003) (noting
that while constitutional protection for location information may be very limited and such
surveillance by private entities falls "outside the scope of constitutional protection,
unreasonable searches and seizures by the government fall under Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence").
68. See JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES 84 (4th ed. 2010) (describing the "threshold of the
Fourth Amendment" as the question of "[w]hat governmental conduct constitutes a search or
seizure of a person, house, paper, or effect and, therefore, triggers Fourth Amendment
protection").
69. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d) (defining the general standard for issuing a warrant to
"search for and seize a person or property or to install and use a tracking device" as
"probable cause").
70. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006) (requiring the government to produce "specific
and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of
a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant
and material to an ongoing criminal investigation" to obtain disclosure under this
subsection).
71. See Smith ECPA Reform Testimony, 111th Cong. 3 (2010) (written testimony of
Stephen W. Smith, United States Mag. J.) (describing the experience of trying to rule on a
CSLI disclosure request as frustrating because "the organization was not intuitive . . . . [t]he
casenotes accompanying the statute shed no light . . . [n]o appellate court had ever addressed
the issue" and "my colleagues . . . were just as puzzled as I was").

1888

68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1875 (2011)
1. What Constitutes a "Search"?

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution safeguards the right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.72 The amendment
provides "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures," and
specifies that this right "shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized."73
The debate over precisely what constitutes a "search and seizure"
under the Fourth Amendment, and thus is entitled to constitutional
protection, began evolving rapidly following the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Katz v. United States.74 The Katz Court rejected the
government’s assertion that the issue should be determined by analysis of
whether or not a telephone booth is a constitutionally protected area, and
framed the issue as whether the surveilled area was one in which a person
has a right to privacy.75 The Court succinctly stated that "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places."76
In a concurrence in the Katz decision, Justice Harlan articulated the
two-prong test for determining whether a "search" is sufficiently invasive to
raise Fourth Amendment concerns: (1) The individual claiming the right
must have exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy; and (2) the
expectation of privacy must be one society views as objectively
reasonable.77 Katz established that a warrant supported by probable cause
was necessary to obtain information electronically, as well as through a

72. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (stating a right to be free from "unreasonable searches
and seizures").
73. Id.
74. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (holding that a search or
seizure must have an "antecedent justification" in order to satisfy the demands of the Fourth
Amendment even when that search is conducted electronically).
75. See id. at 351 (noting the emphasis placed by both parties on the public or private
nature of the telephone booth, and stating that "this effort to decide whether or not a given
‘area’ viewed in the abstract, is ‘constitutionally protected’ deflects attention from the [real]
problem presented by this case").
76. Id.
77. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that
a person ha[s] exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’").
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physical search.78 To determine whether electronic surveillance was a
search and therefore implicated the Fourth Amendment, later decisions by
the Court recognized that Justice Harlan’s test—"a Fourth Amendment
search occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of
privacy that society recognizes as reasonable"79—has emerged as the
standard.80
Following that decision, the Court was left to define precisely what
types of electronic information gathering implicate the Fourth
Amendment.81 In United States v. Knotts,82 the Court considered whether
information obtained by an electronic beeper concealed in a chemical
container purchased by the defendant constituted a search and seizure in
Fourth Amendment parlance.83 The analysis focused on the fact that the
information obtained had been gathered from the beeper while the
defendant was driving on public highways and could have been observed
by law enforcement officials through traditional in-person surveillance.84 A
majority of the Court found this type of surveillance to implicate no Fourth
Amendment concerns because "[a] person traveling in an automobile on
public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
78. See Third Circuit Opinion, 620 F.3d 304, 359 (3d Cir. 2010) (requiring a probable
cause warrant or equivalent "antecedent justification" as a constitutional precondition for
performing electronic surveillance).
79. United States v. Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361).
80. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) ("Consistent[] with Katz,
this Court uniformly has held that the application of the Fourth Amendment depends on
whether the person invoking its protection can claim a ‘justifiable,’ a ‘reasonable,’ or a
‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ . . . .").
81. Compare United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (finding installation of
an electronic tracking device implicated no Fourth Amendment concerns when that device
was used to track their vehicles on public highways where they had no reasonable
expectation of privacy), with United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984) (rejecting the
Government’s claim that it should be able to use tracking devices to identify an object’s
location within a private residence absent a showing of probable cause).
82. See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285 (finding that there was "neither a ‘search’ nor a
‘seizure’ within the contemplation of the Fourth Amendment" because defendant had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movement and location information while on public
highways).
83. See id. at 277 (describing the electronic surveillance used and stating the issue as
"whether such use of a beeper violated respondent’s rights secured by the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution").
84. See id. at 281 (characterizing the government’s electronic surveillance in this case
as "amount[ing] principally to the following of an automobile on public streets and
highways").
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movements from one place to another."85 The Knotts analysis thus
exempted from Fourth Amendment protection electronic surveillance that
revealed details which could have been observed through traditional, nonsearch surveillance techniques, such as following in a car and monitoring
with equipment that merely enhanced the normal faculties of law
enforcement.86
However, in United States v. Karo,87 the Court clarified that under
certain circumstances the location information obtained by a tracking
The Court
device could invade Fourth Amendment protections.88
affirmatively answered one of the questions left unresolved after Knotts:
"[W]hether monitoring of a beeper falls within the ambit of the Fourth
Amendment when it reveals information that could not have been obtained
through visual surveillance."89 In Karo, surveillance revealed the tracking
beeper’s location within a private residence.90 Applying the test articulated
in Katz, the Court found that "private residences are places in which the
individual normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not
authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is
prepared to recognize as justifiable."91 Thus, electronic tracking that
reveals details about the interior of a private residence is more invasive than
the government’s activity in Knotts, and absent a warrant supported by
probable cause such surveillance constitutes a search in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.92
85. Id.
86. See id. at 285 (reasoning that although "the beeper enabled law enforcement
officials in this case to ascertain [information] . . . when they would not have been able to do
so had they relied solely on their naked eyes . . . . scientific enhancement of this sort raises
no constitutional issues which visual surveillance would not also raise").
87. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984) (finding the location
information obtained by use of a tracking beeper to constitute a search where the information
revealed details about the interior of a private residence).
88. See id. at 714 (distinguishing the facts from those in Knotts because the tracking
device was used to obtain information regarding a "location not open to visual
surveillance").
89. Id. at 707.
90. See id. at 714 ("This case thus presents the question whether the monitoring of a
beeper in a private residence, a location not open to visual surveillance, violates the Fourth
Amendment rights of those who have a justifiable interest in the privacy of the residence.").
91. Id.
92. See id. (finding that “the monitoring of a beeper in a private residence . . . not open
to visual surveillance[] violates the Fourth Amendment rights” of individuals with privacy
interests in the residence).
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Most recently, in United States v. Kyllo,93 the Supreme Court stated
that "[w]here . . . the Government uses a device that is not in general public
use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been
unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is
presumptively unreasonable without a warrant." 94 In Kyllo, federal agents
performed a thermal imaging scan of the defendant’s home from a car
parked across the street from the defendant’s house.95 From the Court’s
perspective, the method of surveillance was sufficiently invasive to raise
Fourth Amendment protection because the information obtained could not
have been acquired "without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally
protected area.’"96 The Court noted the long history of Fourth Amendment
protection for activity within the home, concluding that "the Fourth
Amendment draws a firm line at the entrance to the house."97 The
statement regarding "a device that is not in general public use"98 attempted
to clarify that observations which could have been made through the use of
well-known surveillance methods without a physical intrusion would not
fall under the Fourth Amendment even if those observations revealed
details about the home.99 Basically, the lack of general awareness regarding
the technology at issue strengthened the second prong of the Katz test—that
the expectation of privacy is one society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable.100
93. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (finding that electronic
surveillance constitutes a search, and thus is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant,
where "the Government uses a device that is not in general public use to explore details of
the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion").
94. Id. at 40; cf. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (concluding that the
Fourth Amendment does not protect an individual from observations, electronic or
otherwise, that could have been made without a physical intrusion onto private property).
95. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29–30 (describing generally the manner in which thermal
imagers are used and the way in which one was used in the instant case to detect the
presence inside defendant’s home of equipment used to grow marijuana).
96. See id. at 34 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).
97. Id. at 40 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)).
98. Id.
99. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211 (positing that constructing a ten foot fence around
one’s property would be insufficient to protect a homeowner from observations made by law
enforcement officers "perched on the top of a truck or a two-level bus").
100. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (emphasizing that in spite of
advances in sense-enhancing technology there is still a "minimal expectation of privacy that
exists, and that is acknowledged to be reasonable" which must be protected "at least
where . . . the technology in question is not in general public use").
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After tracing the Katz line of cases, the Kyllo Court noted that
determining what methods of surveillance were sufficiently known to the
public such that an individual could not reasonably expect privacy from
such surveillance requires a continual reevaluation of advances in
technology.101 Incorporating this new test for the propriety of electronic
searches, for the purposes of CSLI disclosure, the general question is: Does
this method of electronic surveillance reveal information that the target
expects to remain private and is that expectation of privacy reasonable?102
In order to answer this question it is necessary to consider whether the
surveillance method obtains information that could not have been gathered
by standard visual surveillance103 as well as whether the technology at issue
is in general public use.104
2. Assumption of Risk
From the perspective of CSLI disclosure cases, the right articulated in
Kyllo to be free from surveillance not known to the general public is one of
several factors that must be considered, along with the assumption of risk
principle described in United States v. Miller.105 The Miller Court
addressed a government request for disclosure of financial records provided
by customers to banking institutions.106 Reasoning that the customers
101. Id. at 34 (presenting as an example "the technology enabling human flight [that]
has exposed to public view (and hence, we have said, to official observation) uncovered
portions of the house . . . that once were private").
102. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
("[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person ha[s] exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as ‘reasonable.’").
103. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (holding that the defendant had no
"legitimate expectation of privacy" unless the surveilled activity "would not have been
visible to the naked eye").
104. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 ("Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is
not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been
unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively
unreasonable without a warrant.").
105. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443–44 (1976) (concluding that
individuals possess no reasonable expectation of privacy in information they voluntarily
supply to banks because they assume the risk “that [such] information will be conveyed by
[banks] to the Government”).
106. See id. at 437–38 (responding to the Government’s request for "all records of
accounts, i.e., savings, checking, loan or otherwise in the name of . . . [respondent]" without
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assumed the risk that those records would be made available to the
government when they voluntarily supplied them to the banks, the Court
concluded that, absent a legitimate expectation of privacy, there was no
Fourth Amendment search and thus no violation of the respondent’s Fourth
Amendment interest.107
In Smith v. Maryland,108 the Court extended the Miller rationale to
permit the installation of a pen register to record the numbers dialed on a
targeted telephone.109
The Court focused on the telephone user’s
knowledge that the numbers entered will be transmitted to the phone
company.110 Referencing the similar circumstances in Miller, the Court
concluded that it had "consistently . . . held that a person has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third
parties."111 By using his phone, the party subject to pen register
surveillance in that case was found to have voluntarily supplied the
numbers to the phone company and "assumed the risk that the company
would reveal to police the numbers he dialed."112 Where the targeted party
assumes the risk by voluntarily supplying information to third parties, the
use of devices such as pen registers to collect this information does not
constitute a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.113
Thus, information that would otherwise be protected by the Fourth
Amendment can nonetheless be disclosed to the government absent a
informing the respondent that such disclosure was taking place (internal quotations
omitted)).
107. See id. at 445 ("We hold that the District Court correctly denied respondent’s
motion to suppress, since he possessed no Fourth Amendment interest that could be
vindicated by a challenge to the subpoenas.").
108. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979) (concluding that because
"petitioner . . . entertained no actual expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed,
and that, even if he did, his expectation was not ‘legitimate’" and, "consequently, [recording
the dialed numbers] was not a ‘search,’ and no warrant was required").
109. See id. 736–37 n.1 (describing the installation of a pen register which is "a
mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring the
electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone is released").
110. See id. at 743 ("Telephone users . . . typically know that they must convey
numerical information to the phone company; that the phone company has facilities for
recording this information; and that the phone company does in fact record this information
for a variety of legitimate business purposes.").
111. Id. at 743–44.
112. Id. at 744.
113. See id. at 745–46 ("The installation and use of a pen register . . . was not a
‘search.’").
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showing of probable cause when it has been voluntarily surrendered.114
Assumption of risk is typically claimed by the government in CSLI
disclosure order cases.115 The asserted rationale is that a cellular phone user
voluntarily turns over this information to the cellular provider, and
therefore, the user can have no objective expectation of privacy regarding
CSLI.116
3. Relevant Statutes
Disclosure of CSLI is statutorily controlled generally by the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA),117 which was an attempt by
legislators to find a "fair balance between the privacy expectations of
American citizens and the legitimate needs of law enforcement
agencies."118 However, the practical effect of the statute has been to extend
the authority of law enforcement agencies to monitor cellular
communications.119 The second and third titles of the ECPA, commonly
referred to as the Stored Communications Act (SCA)120 and the Pen
Register Statute,121 along with the later enacted Communications Assistance
for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA),122 serve as the basic statutory
framework within which CSLI jurisprudence has developed.
114. See id. at 745 (declining to make the question of whether to apply the Fourth
Amendment turn on the individual practice of the third party to whom information is
disclosed and instead basing the absence of a Fourth Amendment claim on the fact that the
defendant "voluntarily conveyed" the information).
115. See, e.g., Texas 2005 Opinion, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 756 (S.D. Tex. 2005) ("The
government contends that probable cause should never be required for cell phone tracking
because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in cell site location data, analogizing
such information to the telephone numbers found unprotected in Smith v. Maryland.").
116. See id. (same).
117. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006).
118. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3559.
119. See Lockwood, supra note 5, at 312 n.20 (noting that the ECPA "extend[ed] the
baseline regulatory scheme for ‘wire’ communications to ‘electronic’ communications as
well" (citing Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986))).
120. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 § 201, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–11
(2006).
121. Id. § 301, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–27 (2006).
122. See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act §§ 102–12, 47 U.S.C.
§§ 1001–10 (2006) [hereinafter CALEA] (intending to strike a balance between law
enforcement’s use of increasingly revealing electronic surveillance techniques and personal
privacy interests).
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a. The Pen Register Statute

A pen register, as described in the context of Smith v. Maryland,
records the numbers dialed on a targeted telephone line.123 In Smith, the
Court found that installation and use of a pen register was not a Fourth
Amendment search.124 Because the use of pen registers did not constitute a
search, Congress enacted the Pen Register Statute, which also covers the
use of trap and trace devices,125 to regulate the use of these surveillance
techniques.126 Trap and trace devices work in the opposite direction as pen
registers, recording the electronic impulses that allow the government to
identify the device making a call to the targeted device.127 To obtain a court
order allowing the use of a pen register or trap and trace device under the
Pen Register Statute, the government needs to show "that the information
likely to be obtained . . . is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation."128
The Pen Register Statute is fairly antiquated in light of modern
technology.129 Despite its narrow scope, the statute is still relevant to the
controversy over CSLI disclosure in light of the government’s attempts to
obtain CSLI through the combined authority of the Pen Register Statute, the
SCA, and the CALEA under the so called "hybrid theory," detailed
below.130 Additionally, for purposes of placing CSLI within the hierarchy
of electronic-surveillance techniques, the Pen Register Statute serves as the
123. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 735 n.1 (1979) ("A pen register is a
mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring the
electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone is released. It does not overhear
oral communications and does not indicate whether calls are actually completed.").
124. See id. at 745–46 (concluding that "petitioner . . . entertained no actual expectation
of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed, and that, even if he did, his expectation was not
‘legitimate’" and, "consequently, [there] was not a ‘search,’ and no warrant was required").
125. See 18 U.S.C. § 3121(a) (2006) (providing a general prohibition on the installation
and use of pen registers or trap and trace devices without a court order).
126. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 314 (5th ed. 2009) (discussing the structure of the Pen Register
Statute and explaining how it is "explained by its unique history" as a legislative reaction to
Smith v. Maryland).
127. See Texas 2005 Opinion, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 752 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (“A ‘pen
register’ is a device that records the numbers dialed for outgoing calls made from the target
phone. A trap and trace device captures the numbers of calls made to the target phone.”).
128. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1).
129. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 126, at 314 ("Modern technologies make the
terminology of the pen register statute quite antiquated.").
130. See infra Part III.A.3.d (describing the "hybrid theory" and the reasons courts have
largely rejected it).
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first watermark—the most permissive, purely legislative control over a
form of electronic surveillance that does not constitute a Fourth
Amendment search.131
b. The Stored Communications Act
The SCA regulates government access to stored user account
information compiled by third parties in the ordinary course of business.132
CSLI is sought by the government as a "record or other information
pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service" under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(c)(1).133 CSLI disclosure cases are determined in large part by the
reviewing court’s willingness to apply § 2703(d) which provides:
A court order for disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) . . . shall issue
only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of
a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information
sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation.134

While this section clearly defines the showing required to obtain
information under it, whether CSLI can be obtained by presenting "specific
and articulable facts" that the sought information is "relevant and material
to an ongoing criminal investigation" is the crux of the current debate over
CSLI.135 Under the SCA, the contents of communications are subject to
131. See Texas 2010 Opinion, 727 F. Supp. 2d 571, 572–73 (W.D. Tex. 2010)
(outlining the four types of electronic surveillance that federal permits to be used as
"criminal investigative tools" and noting that pen registers and trap and trace devices are "in
most contexts the least invasive tools").
132. See Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a
Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1212–23 (2004)
(summarizing the goal of the SCA, the entities regulated by it, and the various disclosure
requirements under its subsections, particularly as they relate to modern data collection
techniques by internet service providers).
133. See, e.g., Third Circuit Opinion, 620 F.3d 304, 306 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that in
the instant CSLI disclosure case "the Government seeks what is referred to as ‘a record or
other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service’").
134. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006) (emphasis added).
135. See Pennsylvania 2008 Opinion, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 586 (W.D. Pa. 2008) ("The
Court emphasizes that the issue is not whether the Government can obtain
movement/location information, but only the standard it must meet to obtain a Court Order
for such disclosure and the basis of authority."), vacated, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).

CSLI DISCLOSURE

1897

wholly different disclosure standards than subscriber records and other noncontent information.136 CSLI arguably falls into the non-content category
of "record[s] or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer
of such service."137
Because of this classification, the government has consistently argued
that the SCA allows the disclosure of CSLI based on the satisfaction of
§ 2703(d)’s requirements.138 Courts, however, have been reticent to permit
disclosure under this standard because of both the obligation to protect
individual privacy139 and the express language in the SCA defining
"electronic communications" to exclude "any communication from a
tracking device."140 Essentially, the debate over whether § 2703(d) applies
to CSLI within the context of the SCA is a matter of statutory
interpretation: Authority supports the conclusion that CSLI generally falls
within the definition of a "record or other information pertaining to a
subscriber or customer,"141 but if cellular phones producing CSLI function
as "tracking" devices then the language of the SCA itself exempts that
information from disclosure under § 2703(d), and arguably subjects it to a

136. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)–(b) (providing the requirements the government
must satisfy to compel disclosure of the contents of electronic communications held in
electronic storage and remote computing services), with id. § 2703(c)(1) (providing the ways
in which "[a] governmental entity may require a provider of electronic communication
service or remote computing service to disclose the record or other information pertaining to
a subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the contents of communications)").
137. Id. § 2703(c)(1); see Texas 2010 Opinion, 727 F. Supp. 2d 571, 574 (W.D. Tex.
2010) ("Most courts have assumed (with little or no discussion) that historical CSLI may be
obtained under the SCA because it only amounts to stored records.").
138. See Pennsylvania 2008 Opinion, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 588 ("The Government has
applied, under the Stored Communications Act . . . 18 U.S.C. § 2703, for an Order requiring
a cellular service provider to disclose . . . [CSLI] . . . on the basis of its asserted relevance to
an ongoing criminal investigation . . . .").
139. See id. at 586 (noting that the judiciary is "entrusted with the protection of the
individual civil liberties, including rights of privacy and rights of free
association . . . paramount to the maintenance of our democracy").
140. See id. at 589 ("[T]he SCA expressly sets movement/location information outside
its scope by defining ‘electronic communications’ to exclude ‘any communication from a
tracking device . . . .’"); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (defining "Mobile tracking devices" for
the purposes of the Stored Communications Act).
141. See Texas 2010 Opinion, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 574 ("Most courts have assumed (with
little or no discussion) that historical CSLI may be obtained under the SCA because it only
amounts to stored records.").
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higher standard of proof before the government can obtain the
information.142
i. What Constitutes a Tracking Device?
Under the SCA a "tracking device" is "an electronic or mechanical
device which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or
object."143 In general, federal law requires a showing of probable cause
prior to obtaining a warrant to install a tracking device or perform a
search.144 CSLI may be particularly difficult to identify as a "tracking
device" under the SCA because the definition itself does not state any
degree of specificity required in regard to the location information, and
CSLI data is variably accurate depending on several factors—particularly
the number of towers within range of the cellular phone at a given time.145
In spite of the importance many courts and commentators have placed on
this distinction,146 even if CSLI is classified as a "tracking device," and
therefore is not subject to disclosure under the SCA, the Supreme Court has
held that tracking devices may be used without a showing of probable cause
in many circumstances.147 Thus, although federal law provides a procedure
142. See Smith ECPA Reform Testimony, 111th Cong. 82–83 (2010) (written statement
of Stephen W. Smith, United States Mag. J.) (explaining why he reasoned the SCA did not
apply to CSLI and noting that "[o]ther magistrate judges soon began to weigh in with
[opinions] of their own" and "[m]any agreed").
143. 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b).
144. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d) ("[A] magistrate judge—or if authorized by Rule 41(b),
a judge of a state court of record—must issue the warrant if there is probable cause to search
for and seize a person or property or to install and use a tracking device.").
145. See supra Part II (describing the basic technology involved in creating CSLI data).
Compare Lockwood, supra note 5, at 309 (recognizing that in rural areas "the location
information available to providers is significantly less accurate simply because fewer towers
are available" to receive a given phone’s signal), with id. (explaining that in urban areas with
multiple towers and where the towers are sectioned "into directional ‘faces’ (north face,
south face, etc.)" and the significant number of towers in a relatively small area "gives
providers access to quite accurate location information").
146. See Texas 2005 Opinion, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 753–57 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (engaging
in a detailed analysis of "Prospective Cell Site Data as Tracking Information" after stating
that "[o]ur analysis begins with the tracking device category").
147. Compare United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (finding installation of
an electronic tracking device implicated no Fourth Amendment concerns when that device
was used to track their vehicles on public highways where they had no reasonable
expectation of privacy), with United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984) (rejecting the
Government’s claim that it should be able to use tracking devices to identify an object’s
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for the installation and use of tracking devices, if CSLI surveillance does
not constitute a Fourth Amendment search, then failure to follow federal
procedure or state regulations on law enforcement use of CSLI does not
make out a constitutional violation. The only redress under federal law for
a target who has been tracked by a device that was not installed pursuant to
a warrant supported by probable cause is to move for suppression of that
evidence.148 While Rule 41 lays out the myriad of requirements for issuing
a warrant for a tracking device,149 absent infringement of a constitutional
right, the target will be unable to suppress the location information obtained
from that device.
c. The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
Enacted in 1994, the CALEA is the most recent federal statute directly
concerning CSLI.150 Congress’s stated objective in passing the CALEA
was to "protect privacy in the face of increasingly powerful and personally
revealing technologies."151 The legislation obligates telecommunications
carriers to be able to provide call-identifying information to law
enforcement.152 Under the CALEA, "call-identifying information" is
defined as "dialing or signaling information that identifies the origin,
direction, destination, or termination of each communication generated or
received by a subscriber by means of any . . . telecommunications
carrier."153 The CALEA definition of call-identifying information contains
a specific exception that is particularly relevant to CSLI disclosure:

location within a private residence absent a showing of probable cause).
148. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(h) (providing no remedy for violation of the statute other
than allowing that "[a] defendant may move to suppress evidence in the court where the trial
will occur").
149. See id. 41(e)(2)(C) (detailing the requirements for a warrant to install a tracking
device).
150. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act §§ 102–12, 47 U.S.C.
§§ 1001–10 (2006).
151. H.R. REP. NO. 103-827, at 13 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489, 3493.
152. See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (2006) (requiring “telecommunications carrier[s] [to]
ensure that [their] equipment, facilities, or services that provide a customer or subscriber
with the ability to originate, terminate, or direct communications" are capable of performing
the functions described in the subsections of § 1002).
153. Id. § 1001(2).
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"[S]uch call-identifying information shall not include any information that
may disclose the physical location of the subscriber."154
Significant debate has arisen over whether CSLI is prohibited from
disclosure by this provision of the CALEA.155 Prior to the statute’s
passage, Louis Freeh, former director of the FBI, testified before Congress
regarding the ways in which law enforcement was likely to use the
provisions of the CALEA.156 Freeh expressly disclaimed any intent to
expand the authority of the government to obtain information via electronic
surveillance.157 However, in Third Circuit Opinion, the court reasoned that
"the protections that Congress adopted for CSLI in 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)
have no apparent relevance to § 2703(d)."158 The CALEA was initially
used in the CSLI context to justify disclosure under the now-disfavored
hybrid theory.159 The statute remains important not because it specifically
permits or forbids disclosure of CSLI under the SCA, but because its
legislative history speaks strongly to Congress’s intent to prevent expansion
of the location information that can be obtained by tracking electronic
communications.160
i. The "Hybrid Theory"
154. Id. § 1002(a)(2)(B).
155. See Third Circuit Opinion, 620 F.3d 304, 314–15 (3d Cir. 2010) (disagreeing with
the lower court’s determination that the legislative history of the CALEA indicates a warrant
should be required in order to obtain CSLI).
156. See Joint Hearing on Digital Telephony and Law Enforcement Access to Advanced
Telecommunications Technologies and Services: Hearings on H.R. 4922 and S. 2375 Before
the Subcomm. on Tech. and Law of the S. Judiciary Comm. and the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the H. Judiciary Comm., 103d Cong. 5–46 (1994) (testimony and
statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation) [hereinafter CALEA
Joint Hearings] (containing Director Freeh’s response to Congress’s questions, his prepared
statement, and answers to specific interrogatories regarding the CALEA).
157. See Pennsylvania 2008 Opinion, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 596 (W.D. Pa. 2008)
(characterizing Freeh’s testimony as "reassur[ing] Congress that law enforcement was not
attempting to obtain via the 1994 enactments, or to otherwise alter the standards applicable
to, movement/location information"), vacated, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).
158. Third Circuit Opinion, 620 F.3d at 315.
159. See infra Part III.A.3.i (describing the "hybrid theory" and the reasons courts have
largely rejected it).
160. See CALEA Joint Hearings, 103d Cong. 28 (1994) (testimony and statement of
Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigations) (telling Congress that the
CALEA would "ensure[] the maintenance of the status quo" in regard to location
information).
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Government requests for CSLI have almost always included an
argument that disclosure is permitted under the so-called hybrid theory.161
Some courts found that although the SCA did not provide sufficient
authority to obtain CSLI without probable cause in and of itself, the
combined authority granted to the government by the SCA, CALEA, and
the Pen Register Statute did allow CSLI to be obtained without showing
probable cause.162 The statutory argument claimed that the Pen Register
Statute permits the capture of numbers for incoming and outgoing calls, and
that when used on cellular phones these devices would also disclose CSLI
at the beginning and end of each call.163 Next, the government cited
CALEA as requiring "that courts rely also on some additional statutory
authority when ordering the disclosure of prospective cell site information
under the Pen Register Statute," and contended that this additional authority
was provided by the SCA.164
The first flaw in the hybrid theory is that the SCA contains specific
restrictions on certain types of information disclosure, namely, prospective
information, and although it also contains exceptions to this restriction,
neither pen registers nor any other device covered by the Pen Register
Statute are listed among those exceptions.165 Furthermore, because the
legislative history of CALEA indicates it was not intended to expand the

161. See, e.g., Texas 2005 Opinion, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 761 (S.D. Tex. 2005)
(describing the Government’s "hybrid theory," which combines parts of the PRS, the
CALEA, and the SCA to argue for disclosure of CSLI at the SCA’s "specific and articulable
facts" standard).
162. See In re Application of U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info.
on a Certain Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) [hereinafter New York
Oct. 2006 Opinion] (concluding "that [the court] can order the disclosure of prospective cell
site information pursuant to the combined authority of the Pen Register Statute and the
Stored Communications Act").
163. In re the Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use of a
Pen Register Device, a Trap and Trace Device, and for Geographic Location Info., 497 F.
Supp. 2d 301, 304–06 (D.P.R. 2007) [hereinafter Puerto Rico 2007 Opinion] (summarizing
the "hybrid theory" argument both in the particular case and by referencing aspects of it that
the government has used in other instances).
164. See id. at 305 (specifying the government’s three part argument for disclosure
under the "hybrid theory" (quoting New York Oct. 2006 Opinion, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 454)).
165. See In re the Application of the U.S. for Orders Authorizing the Installation and
Use of Pen Registers and Caller Identification Devices on Tel. Nos. [Sealed] and [Sealed],
416 F. Supp. 2d 390, 395 n.7 (D. Md. 2006) [hereinafter Maryland 2006 Opinion] ("SCA
regulates access to records and communications in storage and therefore lacks provisions
typical of prospective surveillance statutes.").
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ability of law enforcement to obtain location information,166 using it as the
linchpin of expanded surveillance under the SCA and the Pen Register
Statute is widely seen as an implausible argument.167 Due to numerous
flaws that courts have found with the hybrid theory, this approach largely
has fallen out of favor.168
4. "Probable Cause" Versus "Relevant and Material"
The difference between "probable cause" warrants and the standard
required for information disclosure under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) provides
substantially different protection for the targets of CSLI requests.169
Probable cause requires law enforcement seeking the authority to perform a
search or seizure to demonstrate facts that are "sufficient in themselves to
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has or is
being committed."170 On the other hand, court orders issued under the
"relevant and material" standard can target individuals who are not in any
way suspected of criminal activity and gives access to evidence without

166. See supra Part III.A.3.c (describing the CALEA’s legislative history and noting
that during Congressional testimony a high ranking law enforcement official "expressly
disclaimed any intent to expand the authority of the government to obtain information via
electronic surveillance").
167. See Texas 2005 Opinion, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 764 (S.D. Tex. 2005) ("Far from
the silent synergy of disparate statutes now posited by the government, the FBI director in
1994 was insisting that the Pen/Trap Statute has ‘nothing to do with’ the SCA, and that
transactional information ‘is exclusively dealt with in chapter 121 of Title 18,’ i.e., the
SCA." (quoting CALEA Joint Hearings, 103d Cong. 27–28 (1994) (testimony and statement
of Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigations)).
168. See Texas 2010 Opinion, 727 F. Supp. 2d 571, 575 (W.D. Tex. 2010) (declining to
even consider the hybrid theory because "[n]umerous cases have already exhaustively
reviewed the Government’s hybrid argument, and there is no need to restate the various
failings courts have found with it").
169. Compare Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949) (defining
probable cause to exist where "the facts and circumstances within [the officers’] knowledge
and of which they [have] reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves
to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has or is being
committed"), with Pennsylvania 2008 Opinion, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 588 (W.D. Pa. 2008)
(denying the government’s request for CSLI regarding an individual not suspected of
criminal activity but who purportedly associates with a "Criminal Suspect" on a showing of
"specific and articulable facts" under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (internal quotations omitted)),
vacated, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).
170. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175–76.
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requiring any particularity that a crime has been or is being committed.171
Compared to probable cause, disclosure under the relevant and material
standard is both lower in the quantum of evidence required and broader in
the individuals it can potentially target, particularly third parties.172
B. Competing Interpretations of the Law
Lacking a clear standard to apply, district courts have reached
conflicting conclusions regarding CSLI disclosure cases, and these
decisions have been based on a number of the rationales previously
discussed.173 Though not binding precedent, these decisions illustrate the
various theories that inform CSLI disclosure cases, and their holdings
provide background for analyzing the first U.S. Court of Appeals decision
on the issue.174
Focusing on Congress’s intent, the court in In re Application for Pen
Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Authority175 (Texas
171. See Pennsylvania 2008 Opinion, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 588 n.11 (describing the
Government’s application for CSLI disclosure as based on an assertion "that the Subscriber’s
cell phone is ‘being used by’ the Criminal Suspect" and "provid[ing] no specific information
connecting these two individuals, or connecting the Criminal Suspect to the cell phone").
172. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979) ("[A] person’s mere propinquity to
others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to
probable cause to search that person."); id. ("Where the standard is probable cause, a search
or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized with respect to
that person." (emphasis added)).
173. See, e.g., New York Feb. 2006 Opinion, 415 F. Supp. 2d 211, 214 (W.D.N.Y.
2006) (accepting, in dicta, the Government’s interpretation of SCA as authorizing it to
obtain historical CSLI); Wisconsin Opinion, 412 F. Supp. 2d 947, 949 (E.D. Wis. 2006)
(concluding, in dicta and without analysis, that request for prospective CSLI requires
probable cause because it requested prospective rather than historical information); New
York Oct. 2005 Opinion, 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 303 n.6 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating, in dicta and
without explanation, that "§ 2703(d) plainly allows" the Government to seek historical
CSLI); Texas 2005 Opinion, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 759 n.16 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (stating, in
dicta, that were the communication service providers to compile the tracking information
themselves, it would bring the information "more comfortably" within the scope of the
Stored Communications Act).
174. See Third Circuit Opinion, 620 F.3d 304, 305–06 (3d Cir. 2010) ("This appeal
gives us our first opportunity to review whether a court can deny a Government application
under . . . § 2703(d) after the Government has satisfied its burden of proof under that
provision, a task that to our knowledge has not been performed by any other court of
appeals.").
175. See Texas 2005 Opinion, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 765 (concluding that absent clear
Congressional intent, the reading of the statutes that avoids the Fourth Amendment question
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2005 Opinion), preferred the probable-cause-required reading of the statute
because it avoided the potential for a Fourth Amendment conflict.176
Drawing on this analysis and further concentrating on broad issues raised
by the private nature of location information, the court in Pennsylvania
2008 Opinion concluded probable cause was required for both historical
and prospective CSLI.177
Alternatively, the Kansas district court specifically found probable
cause was not required when the government used CSLI to confirm an
individual’s location on a public highway in real time.178 This opinion
extends the principle articulated in Knotts that surveillance that could
lawfully be conducted in person implicates no Fourth Amendment concerns
because "[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has
no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
another."179
In another very specific holding, the Southern District Court of New
York found probable cause is not required so long as the government’s
request is restricted to only that information regarding the tower receiving
the transmission, the information is collected in relation to a call made or
received by the cell phone user, and that information is provided to the
government by the provider.180 Because historical CSLI "only amounts to
stored records," some courts have drawn a distinction between location
by requiring probable cause is preferable).
176. See id. (same).
177. See Pennsylvania 2008 Opinion, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 615–16 (W.D. Pa. 2008)
("[M]ovement/location information . . . is the subject of express Congressional protection.
Indeed, Congress has reiterated throughout the legislative history of its electronic
communications legislation, and reflected in the provisions of its enactments, its recognition
of an individual expectation of privacy in ‘location information.’"), vacated, 620 F.3d 304
(3d Cir. 2010).
178. See United States v. Redd, No. 09-10099-JTM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103385, at
*13 (D. Kan. Sep. 29, 2010) (finding that the use of CSLI to locate defendant in areas where
visual surveillance could also be used did not require probable cause because "defendant had
no reasonable expectation of privacy as he moved in plain view on public highways").
179. Compare id. ("[D]efendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy as he moved
in plain view on public highways."), with United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983)
("A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation
of privacy in his movements from one place to another.").
180. See In re Application of U.S. for an Order for Disclosure of Telecomms. Records
and Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 450
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that the specific information disclosed in that case did not require
a showing of probable cause but retaining the option of finding such a requirement under
future factual circumstances).
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information used to track the target in real time and past location
information, with "[m]ost courts [assuming] (with little or no discussion)
that historical CSLI may be obtained under the SCA because it only
amounts to stored records."181
This line-drawing reflects privacy
advocates’ concern that prospective CSLI is inherently more invasive than
historical CSLI.182
These decisions, all of which were published in the past seven years,183
have not produced a dominant line of reasoning.184 The Third Circuit was
the first U.S. Court of Appeals to consider the issue, and its decision serves
as the most significant analysis in this area to date.185
IV. Third Circuit Opinion
The court in Third Circuit Opinion concluded that "the SCA does not
contain any language that requires the Government to show probable cause
as a predicate for a court order under § 2703(d)."186 However, the court
found that the SCA "as presently written gives the [reviewing judge] the
option to require a warrant showing probable cause."187
181. Texas 2010 Opinion, 727 F. Supp. 2d 571, 574 (W.D. Tex. 2010).
182. See Kevin McLaughlin, Note, The Fourth Amendment and Cell Phone Location
Tracking: Where Are We? 29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 421, 432 (2007) (arguing the
inherent limitations on historical CSLI make it less troublesome from a personal privacy
perspective).
183. See Texas 2010 Opinion, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 573–74 (outlining the series of cases
"[b]eginning in 2005" that "address[ed] many of the questions raised by applications for
CSLI").
184. See Third Circuit Opinion, 620 F.3d 304, 305–06 (3d Cir. 2010) (addressing the
question of whether a court can deny the Government’s application for CSLI disclosure once
it has satisfied § 2703(d)’s burden of proof); Texas 2010 Opinion, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 573–74
(recognizing that while "[t]he majority approach . . . has been to require the same ‘probable
cause’ showing for CSLI regardless of the means by which the information is acquired . . . a
minority of decisions have allowed limited CSLI with only a showing of ‘specific and
articulable facts’"); see also Smith ECPA Reform Testimony, 111th Cong. 85 (2010) (written
statement of Stephen W. Smith, United States Mag. J.) (pointing to "two systemic flaws in
the existing statutory scheme" governing CSLI disclosure that merit reform).
185. See Third Circuit Opinion, 620 F.3d at 305–06 (considering "whether a court can
deny a Government application under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) after the Government has
satisfied its burden of proof under that provision, a task that to our knowledge has not been
performed by any other court of appeals").
186. Id. at 315.
187. Id. at 319 (emphasis added).
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A. Background

The court began by laying out the brief facts relevant to the case
before it, specifying that the government had "applied for a court order
pursuant to . . . § 2703(d), to compel an unnamed cell phone provider to
produce a customer’s ‘historical cellular tower data,’ also known as cell site
location information or ‘CSLI.’"188 After identifying generally the relevant
portions of the SCA and CALEA,189 Sections 2703(a) and 2703(b) were
mentioned specifically in order to emphasize that the government’s request
was not for the contents of any communication.190 The request was limited
to "subscriber information" contained in § 2703(c).191 Adopting the
government’s position, the court stated that "there is no dispute that
historical CSLI is a ‘record or other information pertaining to a
subscriber . . . or customer,’ and therefore falls within the scope of
§ 2703(c)(1)."192 The court specified that the standard for disclosure of this
data under § 2703(d) was a showing of "specific and articulable facts
establishing reasonable grounds" that the information sought is "relevant
and material to an ongoing criminal investigation."193
B. Is Probable Cause Required?
The court summarized Judge Lenihan’s basic holding in the lower
court, that "as a matter of statutory interpretation . . . nothing in the
provisions of the electronic communications legislation authorizes it [i.e.,
188. Id. at 305.
189. See id. at 306 (identifying the SCA and CALEA as the statutes enacted after "[t]he
growth of electronic communications . . . stimulated Congress to enact statutes that provide
both access to information heretofore unavailable for law enforcement purposes
and . . . protect users of such communication services from intrusion that Congress deems
unwarranted").
190. See id. (specifying the scope of § 2703(a)’s coverage as "the contents of wire or
electronic communications in electronic storage" and 2703(b)’s coverage as "the contents of
wire or electronic communications held by a remote computing service" and noting that
"[n]either of those sections is at issue here").
191. See id. ("The Government does not here seek disclosure of the contents of wire or
electronic communications. Instead the Government seeks . . . ’a record or other
information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service’ . . . ." (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(c)(1) (2006))).
192. Id. at 307–08.
193. Id. at 308.
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the Magistrate Judge (MJ)] to order a [provider’s] covert disclosure of
CSLI absent a showing of probable cause under Rule 41."194 Therefore, the
first issue reviewed was whether the relevant and material disclosure
standard adopted by the Government, or probable cause as proposed by the
amici and adopted by the lower court, was required for obtaining the
disclosure order.195
Looking at the language of the SCA and the MJ’s rationale, the court
noted that "[i]f CSLI could be characterized as information from a tracking
device, and a tracking device is not covered by the SCA, this would be a
relatively straightforward case because the Government, when seeking
judicial permission to install or use a tracking device, must ordinarily obtain
a warrant."196 The court characterized the Government’s CSLI request as
consisting "of records of information collected by cell towers when a
subscriber makes a cellular phone call."197 The court recognized that "the
record of a cell phone call does indicate generally where a cell phone was
used when a call was made."198 However, because the court determined
that CSLI was a "wire communication," not an "electronic communication,"
even if a cell phone is deemed a tracking device, CSLI was not excluded by
the SCA’s disclosure provision prohibiting inclusion of "electronic
communications" obtained from a tracking device.199
Next, the court addressed the lower court’s determination that "even if
the CSLI here is included within the scope of § 2703(c)(1), the Government
must show probable cause because a cell phone acts like a tracking
device."200 The court indicated some reticence to permit disclosure of
highly particular location information absent probable cause,201 but
distinguished the present case by characterizing historical CSLI as
194. Id.
195. See id. ("Thus, the counterpoised standards are ‘probable cause,’ the standard for a
Rule 41 warrant, and the ‘relevant and material’ language in 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).").
196. Id. at 309.
197. Id. at 310.
198. Id.
199. See id. at 309–10 ("[E]ven if the record of a cell phone call does indicate generally
where a cell phone was used . . . so that the resulting CSLI was information from a tracking
device, that is irrelevant here because the CSLI derives from a ‘wire communication’ and
not an ‘electronic communication.’").
200. Id. at 310–11.
201. See id. at 311 (recognizing that GPS technology can provide "much more precise
location information" and expressly "tak[ing] no position whether a request for GPS data is
appropriate under a § 2703(d) order").
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"information tending to show that the cell phone user is generally at home
from 7 p.m. until 7 a.m. the next morning (because the user regularly made
telephone calls from that number during that time period)."202 Rather than
determine whether Judge Lenihan was right to conclude that probable cause
was broadly necessary to protect citizens’ legitimate expectations of
privacy,203 the court instead "consider[ed] whether there was any basis for
the MJ’s underlying premises"204 that CSLI was protected by the Fourth
Amendment and therefore a showing of probable cause is necessary in
order to obtain it.205 After analyzing the rationale behind Knotts and
Karo,206 the court found that these "opinions make clear that the privacy
interests at issue are confined to the interior of the home."207 The court
concluded this first point by stating that: "We therefore cannot accept the
MJ’s conclusion that CSLI by definition should be considered information
from a tracking device that, for that reason, requires probable cause for its
production."208
In summary, looking to Congress’s intent, the court concluded that the
standard for disclosure under § 2703(d) was meant to be lower than the
probable cause required for tracking devices because "cell site information
provides only a rough indication of a user’s location at the time a call was
made or received."209 Thus, the court held that CSLI could be obtained
under § 2703(d) and that probable cause need not be shown to require the
disclosure.210
202. Id.
203. See id. at 312 (declining to consider "the premise that CSLI can track a cell phone
user to his or her location, [which led] the MJ to conclude that CSLI would encroach upon
what the MJ believed were citizens’ reasonable expectations of privacy regarding their
physical movements and locations").
204. Id.
205. See id. (discussing the Supreme Court’s opinions in Knotts and Karo to illustrate
what type of movement/location tracking falls within the Fourth Amendment’s protection).
206. See id. (distinguishing Karo from Knotts on the basis that the tracking device in
Karo did not reveal information about the interior of a home, and therefore did not reveal
location information protected by the Fourth Amendment).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 313.
209. See id. at 312; see also id. at 311–12 (discussing the competing interpretations of
FBI Agent William Shute’s testimony regarding the specificity of CSLI as a possible
tracking device).
210. See id. at 313 ("In sum, we hold that CSLI from cell phone calls is obtainable
under a § 2703(d) order and that such an order does not require the traditional probable
cause determination.").
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C. Discussion of Legislative History
The Third Circuit disagreed with the lower court’s determination that
the "relevant legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend its
electronic communications legislation to be read to require, on its authority,
disclosure of an individual’s location information."211 The court points to
numerous statements in the SCA’s legislative history that indicate the act
was intended to serve two purposes: Provide protection for private citizens
from increasingly invasive electronic surveillance and, at the same time,
make that technology available to the government for law enforcement
purposes.212 Based on this language and Congress’s stated aim in amending
the statute through the CALEA "to keep pace with technological
changes,"213 the court concluded that "[t]he legislative history strongly
supports the conclusion that the present standard in § 2703(d) is an
‘intermediate’ one" below probable cause.214
The court also disputed Judge Lenihan’s interpretation of FBI Director
Louis Freeh’s testimony.215 Judge Lenihan had concluded that "Director
Freeh reassured Congress that law enforcement was not attempting to
obtain via the 1994 enactments, or to otherwise alter the standards
applicable to, movement/location information."216
Because Director
Freeh’s testimony had been focused on obtaining tracking information from
a pen register or trap and trace device, and use of those devices is governed
by a standard lower than that required for disclosure under § 2703(d), the

211. Pennsylvania 2008 Opinion, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 610 (W.D. Pa. 2008), vacated,
620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010); see Third Circuit Opinion, 620 F.3d 304, 313 (3d Cir. 2010)
("We also have reviewed the legislative history of the SCA and find no support for [the
magistrate judge’s] conclusion.").
212. See Third Circuit Opinion, 620 F.3d at 313 (citing Senate and House reports to the
effect that the legislation was intended to "protect[] privacy interests in personal and
proprietary information, while protecting the Government’s legitimate law enforcement
needs" (quoting S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555,
3555)).
213. Id. at 314.
214. See id. ("Senate Report No. 103-402 states that § 2703(d) ‘imposes an intermediate
standard to protect on-line transactional records.’" (quoting S. Rep. No. 103-402, at 10
(1994))).
215. See id. ("Director Freeh’s testimony, referred to by the MJ, does not provide
support for the MJ’s conclusion that a warrant is required to obtain CSLI.").
216. Pennsylvania 2008 Opinion, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 596.
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court found that the testimony was not probative of Congress’s intent with
regard to § 2703(d)’s relevant and material standard.217
D. Can Probable Cause Ever Be Required?
The court then proceeded to consider whether magistrate judges have
the discretion to require a probable cause warrant on a case-by-case basis.218
The court considered the amici’s argument219 that the statute’s language
established a necessary, but insufficient, condition for disclosure of the
requested information.220 The court agreed with the government that "a
magistrate judge does not have arbitrary discretion"221 to require probable
cause in a given case,222 but expressed concern "with the breadth of the
Government’s interpretation of the statute that could give the Government
the virtually unreviewable authority to demand a § 2703(d) order on
nothing more than its assertion."223 The court recognized that the
government’s position would preclude magistrate judges from making
particularized determinations as to whether the "disclosure would implicate
the Fourth Amendment, as it could if it would disclose location information
about the interior of a home."224
In response to the Fourth Amendment concerns, the Government
advanced the argument that CSLI was not protected because the subscriber

217. See Third Circuit Opinion, 620 F.3d 304, 314–15 (3d Cir. 2010) (discussing the
focus of Director Freeh’s testimony on pen register and trap and trace devices and
concluding that "the legislative history does not show that Congress intended to exclude
CSLI or other location information from § 2703(d)").
218. See id. at 315 (addressing the contention of the amici "that magistrate judges do
have the discretion to require warrants").
219. See id. at 306 n.1 (explaining that "because the Government’s application was ex
parte, there was no adverse party to review or oppose it," but the court received amici briefs
from the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the ACLU-Foundation of Pennsylvania, Inc., and
the Center for Democracy and Technology "hereafter jointly referred to as ‘EFF’").
220. See id. at 316 (discussing the argument that the "only if" language in § 2703(d)
should be read as a necessary condition for disclosure but that satisfaction is not sufficient
in-and-of-itself to compel disclosure).
221. Id.
222. See id. ("Indeed, no judge in the federal courts has arbitrary discretion to issue an
order.").
223. Id. at 317.
224. Id.
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had voluntarily disclosed that information to a third party.225 The Third
Circuit considered the Government’s assumption of risk argument,226 and
summarily rejected it.227 The court agreed with the EFF that "it is unlikely
that cell phone customers are aware that their cell phone providers collect
and store historical location information."228
Lastly, the court revisited Karo in order to illustrate the importance of
Fourth Amendment oversight.229 The court lamented the "failure of
Congress to make its intention clear"230 and concluded that "[a] review of
the statutory language suggests that the Government can proceed to obtain
records pertaining to a subscriber by several routes, one being a warrant
with its underlying requirement of probable cause, and the second being an
order under § 2703(d)."231 Based on this interpretation, the court found
that, as written, the statute gave magistrate judges the option to require a
showing of probable cause in any individual case, while recommending that
this option be used sparingly.232 Applying these principles to the instant
case, the court vacated the magistrate judge’s order denying the
Government’s application, and remanded the application to the district
court to determine whether the Government had satisfied the standard of
specific and articulable facts that are relevant and material.233

225. See id. ("The Government argues that no CSLI can implicate constitutional
protections because the subscriber has shared its information with a third party, i.e., the
communications provider.").
226. See id. (discussing the Government’s citation to United States v. Miller and Smith
v. Maryland).
227. See id. ("A cell phone customer has not ‘voluntarily’ shared his location
information with a cellular provider in any meaningful way.").
228. Id.
229. See id. at 318 (looking to the Supreme Court’s decision in Karo for the general
proposition that "[i]ndiscriminate monitoring of property that has been withdrawn from
public view would present far too serious a threat to privacy interests in the home to escape
entirely some sort of Fourth Amendment oversight" (quoting United States v. Karo, 468 U.S.
705, 716 (1984))); see also id. ("The Government is also not free from the warrant
requirement merely because it is investigating criminal activity.").
230. Id. at 319.
231. Id.
232. See id. (conceding that "the statute as presently written gives the MJ the option to
require a warrant showing probable cause" but recommending that "it is an option to be used
sparingly because Congress also included the option of a § 2703(d) order").
233. See id. (noting that MJ never determined whether the government actually made
the showing required by § 2703(d) and remanding for determination of that issue).
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E. Judge Tashima’s Concurrence

Judge Tashima concurred with the majority in Third Circuit Opinion,
and wrote separately to address concerns regarding the level of discretion
that the court appeared to be granting to magistrate judges.234 Judge
Tashima was in agreement with the majority that § 2703(d) articulates the
burden of proof the government must show to compel CSLI disclosure,235
but disagreed with the proposition that magistrate judges retained the
discretion to require a showing of probable cause in individual cases.236
In response to these concerns, the concurrence proposes that a
magistrate judge should only be able to deny a disclosure request if the
magistrate judge: (1) "finds that the government failed to present specific
and articulable facts sufficient to meet the standard under § 2703(d)"; or
(2) "finds that the order would violate the Fourth Amendment absent a
showing of probable cause because it allows police access to information
which reveals a cell phone user’s location within the interior or curtilage of
the home."237
V. Analysis of Third Circuit Opinion
The Third Circuit’s opinion arrives at a strange conclusion: Magistrate
judges are granted discretion to require a showing of probable cause in
individual cases, but this discretion is to be used sparingly, and no specific
guidance is provided as to when this discretionary action is warranted.238
Judge Tashima’s concurrence recognizes this incongruity and provides a
coherent recommendation for when such discretion should be exercised.239
234. See id. at 319 (Tashima, J., concurring) ("I write separately, however, because I
find the majority’s interpretation of the discretion granted to a magistrate judge by 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(d) troubling.").
235. See id. at 319–20 (agreeing with the majority’s holding that "CSLI from cell phone
calls is obtainable under a § 2703(d) order and that such an order does not require the
traditional probable cause determination").
236. See id. at 320 (claiming that "the majority then appears to contradict its own
holding" by stating that "the statute as presently written gives the MJ the option to require a
warrant showing probable cause").
237. See id. (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35–36 (2001)).
238. See Third Circuit Opinion, 620 F.3d 304, 319 (3d Cir. 2010) (concluding that the
Stored Communications Act "as presently written gives the [reviewing judge] the option to
require a warrant showing probable cause" (emphasis added)).
239. See id. at 320 (Tashima, J., concurring) (recommending that "the magistrate may
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If CSLI reveals location information inside of a private residence, that
information is protected by the Fourth Amendment.240 The court is explicit
throughout the opinion in recognizing the importance of protecting privacy
in the home.241 How then, does the court arrive at a conclusion that would
generally permit the government to order disclosure of information that
potentially was obtained from inside a private residence absent a probable
cause requirement?
A. The Third Circuit’s Interpretation of CSLI Technology
The answer to this question can be gleaned from a number of the
court’s statements regarding CSLI technology. In the court’s discussion of
whether CSLI should be classified as a wire communication or an
electronic communication, CSLI is described as "records of information
collected by cell towers when a subscriber makes a cellular phone call."242
The conclusion that CSLI may in some instances be properly classified as
information from a tracking device is thereafter predicated on
circumstances where "the record of a cell phone call does indicate generally
where a cell phone was used when a call was made."243 Later, the court
summarizes its impression of historical CSLI as possibly "provid[ing]
refuse to issue the § 2703(d) order" if "the order would violate the Fourth Amendment
absent a showing of probable cause because it allows police access to information which
reveals a cell phone user’s location within the interior or curtilage of the home").
240. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment
draws ‘a firm line at the entrance to the house.’" (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 590 (1980))); Third Circuit Opinion, 620 F.3d at 318 ("Indiscriminate monitoring of
property that has been withdrawn from public view would present far too serious a threat to
privacy interests in the home to escape entirely some sort of Fourth Amendment oversight."
(quoting United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716 (1984))).
241. See Third Circuit Opinion, 620 F.3d at 312 (looking to the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Knotts and Karo and concluding that those "opinions make clear that the
privacy interests at issue are confined to the interior of the home"); id. at 317 (expressing
concern that the Government’s position would preclude magistrate judges from making
particularized determinations as to whether the "disclosure would implicate the Fourth
Amendment, as it could if it would disclose location information about the interior of a
home"); id. at 318 ("Indiscriminate monitoring of property that has been withdrawn from
public view would present far too serious a threat to privacy interests in the home to escape
entirely some sort of Fourth Amendment oversight." (quoting United States v. Karo, 468
U.S. 705, 716 (1984))).
242. Id. at 310.
243. Id. (emphasis added).
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information tending to show that the cell phone user is generally at home
from 7 p.m. until 7 a.m. the next morning (because the user regularly made
telephone calls from that number during that time period)."244 Clearly, the
court is proceeding on the understanding that CSLI is only created when a
user makes or receives a phone call. This is simply not the case. CSLI is
created whenever a cellular phone registers with the network, a process that
occurs approximately every seven seconds.245 In the hands of law
enforcement, disclosed CSLI can be used to provide detailed information
about the location and movement of an individual carrying the device, even
if that individual never makes a call.246
The fundamental misunderstanding about the breadth of information
CSLI provides is also implicit in Judge Tashima’s concurring opinion.247
After recognizing that the discretion the majority granted to magistrate
judges is arbitrary,248 Judge Tashima proposes to "cabin the magistrate’s
discretion"249 to require probable cause only where the government has
failed to make the requisite showing under § 2703(d),250 or where "it allows
244. See id. at 311 (concluding that "[w]ith that information, the Government may
argue in a future case that a jury can infer that the cell phone user was at home at the time
and date in question").
245. See Pennsylvania 2008 Opinion, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 589–90 (W.D. Pa. 2008)
("Cell phones, whenever on, now automatically communicate with cell towers, constantly
relaying their location information to the towers serving their network and scanning for the
one that provides the strongest signal/best reception. This process, called ‘registration’,
occurs approximately every seven seconds."), vacated, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010);
Lockwood, supra note 5, at 309 ("Even when users are not making or receiving calls, cell
phones communicate with the nearest cell tower to register.").
246. See Lockwood, supra note 5, at 312 ("The reality that people carry their cell
phones on their persons means that cell phone tracking technology potentially offers a
detailed view of a given subscriber’s movements rather than simply providing callidentifying information."); see also id. at 309 ("Even when users are not making or receiving
calls, cell phones communicate with the nearest cell tower to register.").
247. See Third Circuit Opinion, 620 F.3d 304, 319–20 (3d Cir. 2010) (Tashima, J.,
concurring) (expressing disagreement with the majority opinion’s grant of discretion to
magistrate judges to require probable cause and advocating for a showing of probable cause
only when the information will place the cell phone user within the home with no mention of
how often this will occur).
248. See id. at 320 ("[T]he majority’s interpretation of the statute . . . vests magistrate
judges with arbitrary and uncabined discretion to grant or deny issuance of § 2703(d) orders
at the whim of the magistrate . . . .").
249. Id.
250. See id. ("I would cabin the magistrate’s discretion by holding that the magistrate
may refuse to issue the § 2703(d) order only if she finds that the government failed to
present specific and articulable facts sufficient to meet the standard under § 2703(d) . . . .").
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police access to information which reveals a cell phone user’s location
within the interior or curtilage of the home."251 Ironically, Tashima’s
recognition that granting magistrate judges the discretion to require
probable cause is unwarranted unless the Fourth Amendment is implicated,
which presumably would lead to most disclosure requests being granted
based on satisfying § 2703(d),252 actually illustrates why probable cause
should almost always be required—CSLI provides sufficiently detailed
information to implicate the Fourth Amendment in almost every case.253
B. What Is Protected by the Fourth Amendment?
Although the Third Circuit’s opinion appears to mischaracterize CSLI
technology,254 the court is consistent throughout its opinion in identifying
how integral the Fourth Amendment is to this issue.255 The court explicitly
rejects the argument that cell phone users voluntarily disclose their location
information to third parties.256 Additionally, there are numerous statements
in the opinion expressing the court’s concern that CSLI might be able to
provide law enforcement information about an individual’s location within
251. Id.
252. See id. ("[T]he magistrate may refuse to issue the § 2703(d) order here only if she
finds that the government failed to present specific and articulable facts sufficient to meet
the standard under § 2703(d) or, alternatively, finds that the order would violate the Fourth
Amendment absent a showing of probable cause . . . .").
253. See infra Part VI (describing the extremely limited circumstances in which CSLI
would not place targets within their homes).
254. See supra Part V.A (pointing out language in Third Circuit Opinion which
indicates the court’s misunderstanding that CSLI is only created when a call is made or
received).
255. See Third Circuit Opinion, 620 F.3d 304, 312 (3d Cir. 2010) (looking to the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Knotts and Karo and concluding that those "opinions make
clear that the privacy interests at issue are confined to the interior of the home"); id. at 317
(expressing concern that the Government’s position would preclude magistrate judges from
making particularized determinations as to whether the "disclosure would implicate the
Fourth Amendment, as it could if it would disclose location information about the interior of
a home"); id. at 318 ("Indiscriminate monitoring of property that has been withdrawn from
public view would present far too serious a threat to privacy interests in the home to escape
entirely some sort of Fourth Amendment oversight." (quoting United States v. Karo, 468
U.S. 705, 716 (1984))); id. at 320 (Tashima, J., concurring) (proposing magistrate judges
should only be permitted to exercise their discretion to require probable cause in cases where
"the order would violate the Fourth Amendment absent a showing of probable cause").
256. See id. at 317 ("A cell phone customer has not ‘voluntarily’ shared his location
information with a cellular provider in any meaningful way.").
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a private residence.257 The court also states that the general public is not
aware of this passive electronic surveillance technology.258 What the
majority opinion glosses over is how a reviewing magistrate judge should
take these interests into account in deciding whether or not to issue a
disclosure order.259 The concurrence by Judge Tashima posits the answer to
this question by noting that where the magistrate judge expects the
information sought will implicate the Fourth Amendment, probable cause
should be required.260 However, Judge Tashima seems to indicate that
CSLI requests will rarely implicate the Fourth Amendment.
The court’s grant of discretionary authority to magistrate judges is
troublesome in two respects. First, if the Fourth Amendment does not
protect CSLI, the statutory standard is clear and there is no articulable basis
for demanding a showing of probable cause.261 This recognition is reflected
in the court’s admonishment that though "the statute as presently written
gives the MJ the option to require a warrant showing probable cause . . . it
is an option to be used sparingly."262 Second, if the Fourth Amendment
does protect the location information sought, the probable cause
requirement attaches. Although the legislative history may be ambiguous
257. See id. at 312 (looking to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Knotts and Karo and
concluding that those "opinions make clear that the privacy interests at issue are confined to
the interior of the home"); id. at 317 (expressing concern that the Government’s position
would preclude magistrate judges from making particularized determinations as to whether
the "disclosure would implicate the Fourth Amendment, as it could if it would disclose
location information about the interior of a home"); id. at 318 ("‘Indiscriminate monitoring
of property that has been withdrawn from public view would present far too serious a threat
to privacy interests in the home to escape entirely some sort of Fourth Amendment
oversight.’" (quoting United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716 (1984))).
258. See id. at 317 (agreeing with the EFF that "it is unlikely that cell phone customers
are aware that their cell phone providers collect and store historical location information").
259. See id. at 319 (refusing to remove the option to require a warrant in an individual
case and remanding only with instruction that the magistrate judge "give a full explanation
that balances the Government’s need . . . for the information with the privacy interests of cell
phone users").
260. See id. at 320 (Tashima, J., concurring) (recommending the magistrate’s discretion
to require probable cause be exercised where "the order would violate the Fourth
Amendment absent a showing of probable cause because it allows police access to
information which reveals a cell phone user’s location within the interior or curtilage of the
home").
261. See id. at 319 (majority opinion) ("A warrant requires probable cause, but there is
no such explicit requirement for securing a § 2703(d) order.").
262. See id. (recommending the option to require probable cause be used sparingly after
consistently noting that under § 2703(d) "there is no such explicit requirement").
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with regard to whether Congress intended to permit disclosure of location
information,263 there is no indication that it intended to erode privacy in the
home where an individual’s Fourth Amendment interest is strongest.264
VI. Proposed Solution
Viewing the court’s analysis in light of the realities of CSLI
technology, the precedent it creates for lower courts is both inadequate to
protect the residential privacy interests of individuals and gives unclear
guidance to law enforcement seeking to use CSLI for legitimate purposes.
However, there is a ready solution to this incongruity that can be
extrapolated from the majority and concurring opinions.
First, the court repeatedly notes that if CSLI reveals location
information about the interior of the home, that information raises Fourth
Amendment concerns.265 Judge Tashima’s concurrence specifically cited
disclosure of location-within-the-home information as the circumstance
which should cause a magistrate judge to require a showing of probable
cause.266 On the other hand, CSLI that tracks an individual’s location
263. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the Third Circuit’s interpretation of the SCA’s
legislative history in comparison to the lower court’s contrary interpretation).
264. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment
draws ‘a firm line at the entrance to the house.’" (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 590 (1980))); Third Circuit Opinion, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Cir. 2010) (expressing
concern that the Government’s position would preclude magistrate judges from making
particularized determinations as to whether the "disclosure would implicate the Fourth
Amendment, as it could if it would disclose location information about the interior of a
home").
265. See Third Circuit Opinion, 620 F.3d at 312 (looking to the Supreme Court’s
Fourth Amendment decisions in Knotts and Karo and concluding that those "opinions make
clear that the privacy interests at issue are confined to the interior of the home"); id. at 317
(expressing concern that the Government’s position would preclude magistrate judges from
making particularized determinations as to whether the "disclosure would implicate the
Fourth Amendment, as it could if it would disclose location information about the interior of
a home"); id. at 318 ("Indiscriminate monitoring of property that has been withdrawn from
public view would present far too serious a threat to privacy interests in the home to escape
entirely some sort of Fourth Amendment oversight." (quoting United States v. Karo, 468
U.S. 705, 716 (1984))).
266. See id. at 320 (Tashima, J., concurring) (recommending the magistrate’s discretion
to require probable cause be exercised where "the order would violate the Fourth
Amendment absent a showing of probable cause because it allows police access to
information which reveals a cell phone user’s location within the interior or curtilage of the
home").
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outside of the home is indistinguishable from location information that
could be obtained via in-person surveillance.267 As the court makes clear
and precedent amply supports, this type of public-location surveillance does
not implicate the Fourth Amendment.268 Thus, the threshold determination
must be whether a given disclosure order will likely reveal an individual’s
location within the home.
In order to answer this question in the negative, a reviewing magistrate
judge would have to decide that automatic cell phone registration, which
takes place approximately every seven seconds,269 would not place the
target within the home at any point during the period for which disclosure is
requested. Placement of an individual within their residence during the
period of time for which CSLI is sought implicates the Fourth Amendment
and its probable cause requirement.270
To see just how often this situation will arise, it may be illustrative to
return to the hypothetical presented at the end of Part II.271 Assume the
government obtains a broad CSLI disclosure order on a Monday. Historical
CSLI from a specific date prior to that Monday would implicate the Fourth
Amendment if the target was within her home, with her cell phone on her
267. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281, 285 (1983) (finding the
surveillance target’s Fourth Amendment interest was not implicated where the surveillance
"amounted principally to the following of an automobile on public streets and highways").
268. See id. at 281 (characterizing the government’s permissible electronic surveillance
in this case as "amount[ing] principally to the following of an automobile on public streets
and highways"); id. at 285 (finding installation of an electronic tracking device implicated no
Fourth Amendment concerns when that device was used to track their vehicles on public
highways where they had no reasonable expectation of privacy); Third Circuit Opinion, 620
F.3d at 312 (looking to the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions in Knotts and
Karo and concluding that those "opinions make clear that the privacy interests at issue are
confined to the interior of the home").
269. See Pennsylvania 2008 Opinion, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 589–90 (W.D. Pa. 2008)
("Cell phones, whenever on, now automatically communicate with cell towers, constantly
relaying their location information to the towers serving their network and scanning for the
one that provides the strongest signal/best reception. This process, called ‘registration’,
occurs approximately every seven seconds."), vacated, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).
270. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment
draws ‘a firm line at the entrance to the house.’" (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 590 (1980))); Third Circuit Opinion, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Cir. 2010) (expressing
concern that the Government’s position would preclude magistrate judges from making
particularized determinations as to whether the "disclosure would implicate the Fourth
Amendment, as it could if it would disclose location information about the interior of a
home").
271. See supra Part II (identifying the differences between historical, prospective, and
real-time CSLI through a hypothetical adapted from Maryland 2005 Opinion).
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person, on that particular date. On Friday, when law enforcement returned
to obtain CSLI from Wednesday and Thursday, that prospective CSLI is
protected by the Fourth Amendment if the target was inside the home with
her cell phone turned on during Wednesday or Thursday. Finally, when
tracking the target’s phone in real time, that real time CSLI invades the
Fourth Amendment when the target enters her private residence.
Cell phones are a ubiquitous feature of modern life.272 Cell phone
users will have their phones on them just as surely as they will, at some
point in time within the scope of a CSLI request, be located at home.273
Therefore, because CSLI will almost always reveal information about the
interior of the home that is protected by the Fourth Amendment, magistrate
judges should either require a showing of probable cause, or allow law
enforcement to only use CSLI that does not reveal information about the
interior of the home.274 Functionally, as Judge Tashima proposes,
magistrate judges could "condition [their] order[s] by requiring
minimization to exclude those portions which disclose location information
protected by the Fourth Amendment, i.e., within the home and its
curtilage."275
Structuring disclosure requests in this manner would extend to the
realm of electronic surveillance the principle that law enforcement can
follow a suspect without probable cause in public, but not inside a private
residence.276 In circumstances where law enforcement legitimately needs
location information that places the target within a private residence, as the
Third Circuit noted, probable cause is typically not difficult to

272. See CTIA-The Wireless Association, CTIA’s Semi-Annual Wireless Industry
Survey, (2010) http://ctia.org/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2010) (estimating that as of June 2010
there were 292,847,098 cell phone in use in the United States and 251,618 cell sites) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
273. See Lockwood, supra note 5, at 312 ("The reality [is] that people carry their cell
phones on their persons . . . .").
274. See Third Circuit Opinion, 620 F.3d 304, 319 (3d Cir. 2010) ("[I]t is imperative
that the MJ make fact findings and give a full explanation that balances the Government’s
need (not merely desire) for the information with the privacy interests of cell phone users.");
id. at 320 (Tashima, J., concurring) (recommending that the discretion to require a showing
of probable cause be exercised if "the order would violate the Fourth Amendment absent a
showing of probable cause because it allows police access to information which reveals a
cell phone user’s location within the interior or curtilage of his home").
275. Id. at 320 n.10 (Tashima, J., concurring).
276. See supra Part III.A.1 and notes 81–92 (discussing the distinction the Supreme
Court drew in Knotts and Karo between surveillance in public and within the home).
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demonstrate.277 This modest limitation: (1) recognizes that in light of
modern technology the starting point for CSLI disclosure analysis must
presuppose that a target’s Fourth Amendment interest will be implicated;
and (2) is consistent with the Supreme Court’s prior Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.278 However, although a general requirement of probable
cause and a limitation on CSLI that invades the home would be seen as a
victory for personal privacy in comparison to the Third Circuit’s
conclusion,279 it is worth considering precisely what is left for the Fourth
Amendment to protect.
VII. Conclusion
As CSLI has become an increasingly important tool for law
enforcement, courts have struggled to find a balance that recognizes the
statutory authorization for disclosure and at the same time acknowledges
the personal privacy interests at stake.280 While numerous courts and
commentators have joined the call for Congress to reform and clarify the
relevant legislation,281 until that occurs, magistrate judges routinely face the
very real task of ruling on disclosure orders with only the current statutory
framework as a guide.
277. Third Circuit Opinion, 620 F.3d at 317 n.8 ("In our experience, magistrate judges
have not been overly demanding in providing warrants as long as the Government is not
intruding beyond constitutional boundaries.").
278. Compare United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (finding installation of
an electronic tracking device implicated no Fourth Amendment concerns when that device
was used to track their vehicles on public highways where they had no reasonable
expectation of privacy), with United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984) (rejecting the
Government’s claim that it should be able to use tracking devices to identify an object’s
location within a private residence absent a showing of probable cause).
279. See Third Circuit Opinion, 620 F.3d at 319 (concluding that "the SCA does not
contain any language that requires the Government to show probable cause as a predicate for
a court order under § 2703(d)").
280. See supra Part III.B (outlining the conflicting decisions and rationales of district
courts in CSLI disclosure order cases).
281. See Third Circuit Opinion, 620 F.3d 304, 319 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting the difficulty
facing courts addressing the proper standard to apply to CSLI disclosure orders and stating
that "[t]he considerations for and against [a probable cause] requirement would be for
Congress to balance"); Smith ECPA Reform Testimony, 111th Cong. 85–90 (2010) (written
testimony of Hon. Stephen W. Smith, United States Mag. J.) (proposing Congress enact
numerous reforms to the ECPA in light of the difficulty judges face in deciding disclosure
order cases).
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The Third Circuit attempted to provide guidance on this issue, but
although much of its opinion accurately discussed the relevant
constitutional considerations, a fundamental misunderstanding about CSLI
technology led the court to conclude the Fourth Amendment would rarely
be implicated,282 in spite of the fact that where information about the
interior of the home is at issue, the Fourth Amendment "draws a firm
line."283 Thus, in the case of CSLI, the starting point must be to recognize
that information about the interior of the home will almost always bring
Fourth Amendment considerations to the fore.
Future disclosure order cases should follow Judge Tashima’s
recommendation that a magistrate judge should only be able to deny a
disclosure request if the magistrate judge: (1) "finds that the government
failed to present specific and articulable facts sufficient to meet the standard
under § 2703(d)"; or (2) "finds that the order would violate the Fourth
Amendment absent a showing of probable cause because it allows police
access to information which reveals a cell phone user’s location within the
interior or curtilage of the home."284 However, because the order will, in
almost all cases, violate the Fourth Amendment absent a showing of
probable cause, the magistrate judge should routinely "condition [the] order
by requiring minimization to exclude those portions which disclose location
information protected by the Fourth Amendment, i.e., within the home and
its curtilage."285
Finally, while the current state of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
advocates strongly for the solution this Note proposes, it is worth
considering just what this state of affairs means for personal privacy. There
are almost 300 million cellular phones being used in the United States.286
These phones are in constant communication with over 250,000 cell sites

282. See supra Part V.A (illustrating the Third Circuit’s misunderstanding that CSLI is
only created when a cell phone makes or receives a call).
283. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment
draws ‘a firm line at the entrance to the house.’" (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 590 (1980))).
284. See Third Circuit Opinion, 620 F.3d at 320 (Tashima, J., concurring) (citing Kyllo,
533 U.S. at 35–36).
285. Id. at 320 n.10.
286. See CTIA-The Wireless Association, CTIA’s Semi-Annual Wireless Industry
Survey, (2010) http://ctia.org/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2010) (estimating that as of June 2010
there were 292,847,098 cell phone in use in the United States) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
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that can be used to pinpoint an individual’s location.287 That these phones
are almost always carried on an individual’s person is almost too plain an
observation to warrant stating.288 Practically speaking, there are almost 300
million tracking devices being carried around in the United States, and at
best the Constitution protects them from being used to track a target’s
location when that target enters his or her home.289 The target may be
tracked up until the moment the home is entered, and tracking may resume
as soon as the target is once again beyond the home and its curtilage.290 Is
this really the type of surveillance the Court had in mind when it defined
the limits on law enforcement use of tracking devices in Knotts and Karo?
Unfortunately, while courts have been struggling with CSLI disclosure
order cases for some time,291 Congress has only recently taken notice and
reform legislation does not appear imminent.292 As a judicial remedy, the
compromise proposed by this Note draws a line that at least preserves
Fourth Amendment protection where it has traditionally been deemed

287. See id. (estimating that as of June 2010 there were 251,618 cell sites in the United
States).
288. See Lockwood, supra note 5, at 312 ("The reality [is] that people carry their cell
phones on their persons . . . .").
289. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment
draws ‘a firm line at the entrance to the house.’" (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 590 (1980))); Third Circuit Opinion, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Cir. 2010) (expressing
concern that the Government’s position would preclude magistrate judges from making
particularized determinations as to whether the "disclosure would implicate the Fourth
Amendment, as it could if it would disclose location information about the interior of a
home"). Compare United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (finding installation of
an electronic tracking device implicated no Fourth Amendment concerns when that device
was used to track their vehicles on public highways where they had no reasonable
expectation of privacy), with United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984) (rejecting the
Government’s claim that it should be able to use tracking devices to identify an object’s
location within a private residence absent a showing of probable cause).
290. See Third Circuit Opinion, 620 F.3d at 320 (Tashima, J., concurring) (recognizing
that CSLI location tracking only violates the Fourth Amendment when "it allows police
access to information which reveals a cell phone user’s location within the interior or
curtilage of his home").
291. See Texas 2010 Opinion, 727 F. Supp. 2d 571, 573–74 (W.D. Tex. 2010)
(outlining the series of cases "[b]eginning in 2005" that "address[ed] many of the questions
raised by applications for CSLI").
292. See Smith ECPA Reform Testimony, 111th Cong. 79–91 (2010) (written testimony
of Hon. Stephen W. Smith, United States Mag. J.) (informing Congress of the problems
faced by magistrate judges reviewing CSLI disclosure requests and proposing numerous
legislative solutions, none of which have been enacted in the ensuing months).
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strongest,293 but the limitations of that protection in comparison to the
amount of tracking data the government can access without a showing of
probable cause should give one pause. Until Congress takes action or the
Court reconsiders its tracking device jurisprudence in light of modern
technology, this is where the dispute will lie. The Fourth Amendment
remains a bulwark against invasion of the home. But take just one step
outside the castle and it is clear that the lines have been drawn in such a
way that personal privacy, in terms of location information, is a thing of the
past.

293. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 ("[T]he Fourth Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the
entrance to the house.’" (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980))).

